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National Workshop on Control Strategies  
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17 and 18 April, 2001 – AMA House, Barton ACT 
 
Terms of Reference for National Workshop  
(from NOJDPAC 11 OOS Paper 6) 
 
1. “In the light of current knowledge of the regional prevalence of OJD, to examine 
strategies which will lead to the control of OJD, and recommend optimal control 
strategies for different zones, but in particular for higher prevalence regions.” 
 
2. “To examine strategies available for the on-farm control of OJD, and assess the 
impact of on-farm control strategies on regional control; and recommend 
appropriate on-farm control strategies.” 
 
3. “Provide a report on the outcomes of the Workshop to the TSC Chair by 1 
February 2001.” 
 
Statement of Purpose of Workshop (after recent NOJDPAC meeting) 
 
The purpose of this MLA sponsored workshop is to facilitate a structured discussion 
by national and state OJD technical advisers of a number of proposals for change to 
the on-farm strategies currently applied in NSW for controlling the spread of OJD, 
particularly within and from high disease prevalence areas. 
 
The NOJDP Program Advisory Committee support and MLA funding for the 
workshop is premised on the view that the on-farm control strategies for OJD that 
are adopted in NSW have significant implications for other states and the control 
component of the NOJDP.  
 
The workshop will consider and rank available control strategies for OJD in NSW in 
the context of the changing epidemiological situation in NSW, recent advances in 
scientific knowledge and the broader social and economic circumstances in which 
control of OJD in NSW is set, particularly in the high prevalence area.  
 
All available on-farm control options will be considered, with due regard given to 
regional OJD control objectives within NSW and current agreed national control 
objectives, in order that practical and achievable strategies for controlling further 
spread of OJD within and from NSW are identified and documented. Although the 
optimal control strategies for NSW, particularly for high prevalence areas, may be 
immediately appropriate only within NSW, such recommendations may also be 
relevant within and around any other high prevalence area that is identified 
elsewhere in the future. 
 
The sole objective of the workshop is to identify practical and achievable strategies 
for controlling further spread of OJD in NSW, particularly within and from the 
major high disease prevalence area - within the context of the existing, biological, 
epidemiological, social, economic, political and financial situation. 
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Program 
 
Day 1  The Current Disease Situation  
and Potential Control Strategies 
 
9.00 am Welcome - Robin Vandergraaff, Chair 
 
9:05 am Opening and Expected Outcomes from the Workshop - John Kerin 
 
9:15 am Workshop Procedures - Denis Hussey 
 
9:30 am Setting the Scene: OJD Control and Zoning in Australia to Date - Bruce Allworth  
 
9:45 am Lateral Spread of OJD Infection - Evan Sergeant/Steve Whittaker 
 Recently recognised in NSW as an important pathway for the spread of OJD to previously 
uninfected properties, “lateral spread” between adjoining properties appears likely to be a 
problem for effective regional control of OJD in NSW. Evidence that “lateral spread” is 
occurring and is now a significant source of new property infection in NSW will be 
presented. 
  
Session 1 
 
10:00 am The Disease Control Context - Denis Hussey  
 This session will discuss the non-biological aspects of the NSW environment with 
which any adopted disease control strategies will interact, including political, 
social, economic, legal, administrative and financial aspects. 
 
Session 2 
 
11.00 am Potential Control Objectives and Strategies - Denis Hussey 
 
This session will cover: 
1. potential on-farm and regional objectives for OJD control in NSW, particularly in high 
disease prevalence areas  
2. current on-farem and regional control strategies in NSW, particularly in high disease 
prevalence areas  
3. potential new control strategies for NSW, particularly for high disease prevalence areas  
 
The aims are  
• to examine the on-farm control objectives for OJD in NSW to see what is 
realistic with current technology and knowledge about this disease and its 
distribution in NSW,  
• to allow participants to identify possible shortcomings  in current control 
strategies and policies in NSW,  
• to list and broadly examine all potential control strategies and to get an 
understanding of their potential application - but without making any choices at 
this stage, and 
• to identify any limitations upon appropriate new control strategies for NSW 
under the current SD&Rs, particularly in high disease prevalence areas. 
 
 
1:00 pm  Lunch 
2:00 pm continued: Control Objectives and Strategies 
 
3:00 pm Proposed Changes to Control Policy in NSW  - Ian Roth 
 
The aim of this presentation is to summarise proposals for managing OJD in NSW 
with a “Three Zone” system of Residual, Control and Proposed Protected in which 
disease control policies will be varied according to the disease situation in each 
area but consistent with the overall need to minimise spread.  Issues to be 
considered will include proposals for reducing movement restrictions in the NSW 
restricted zone, permitting the trading of vaccinated sheep between infected and 
suspect properties in the NSW residual zone and reducing the spread of infection 
from the NSW residual zone.  
 
Session 3 
 
3:15 pm Risks to Effective Control of OJD in NSW and Proposals for  
Disease Control in NSW to be based on Risk Management  
- Denis Hussey  
  
  This session will identify and discuss: 
 
1. the major risks to effective control of disease spread in NSW - including 
biological and politico-social risks.  This session will identify critical links 
between effective on-farm control and effective regional control 
The aim is to identify and agree on the significant risks to effective control 
of further spread of OJD within and from NSW in terms of the on-farm 
strategies for control of OJD in NSW 
 
2. acceptable risks from sheep trading in NSW and ways to balance the 
interest of affected individuals in continued trading against the communal 
interest in maximum disease control. 
The aim is to discuss: 
i. acceptable risk from different perspectives – particularly from the 
perspective of states with little or no OJD infection to date,  
ii. ways to facilitate a legal trade in affected stock in NSW and thereby 
obtain better compliance with movement restrictions. (The overall risk of 
spread under a low or controlled risk system for trade may be less than 
from a potentially nil-risk system - such as total quarantine - if there is 
poor compliance with the supposedly nil-risk policy.) 
 
6:00 pm CLOSE FOR DAY 1 
 
7:00 pm Workshop Dinner - Venue to be advised. 
This will be an informal working evening - participants who miss the dinner may find 
themselves behind the play on the second day! 
 
 
 
 
Day 2 Identifying Optimal Disease Control Strategies 
for Containing the Spread of OJD in NSW 
 
Session 4 
 
8:30 am Identifying practical and achievable strategies for on-farm control of 
OJD in NSW - Denis Hussey 
 
 Consensus from the technical participants at the workshop will sought on: 
 
 1. The most practical and achievable disease control objectives for NSW, 
particularly for the high prevalence areas  
 The aim is to create by consensus a list of principal control objectives for 
OJD that are likely have broad support. 
 
 2. The most practical and achievable disease control strategies for NSW, 
particularly in the high prevalence areas (matched to control objectives). 
 The aim is to ensure that appropriate control strategies for each control 
objective are identified 
  
 It is also an objective of this session to identify:  
  
 3. Any limitations or conditions likely to be required by individual stakeholders 
before any such strategy for control of OJD in NSW can be endorsed and 
supported by stakeholders. 
 The aim is to identify and discuss concerns that particular stakeholders might have 
with the identified optimal strategies for control of OJD in NSW and the conditions 
these stakeholders might require before endorsing such strategies. 
 
12:00 pm  Lunch 
 
Session 5 
 
1:00 pm Controlling OJD in NSW – How will it be achieved?  - Denis Hussey 
 
The objective of this session is to reflect on the objectives and strategies 
identified as optimal for control of OJD in NSW in Session 4 to ensure that 
there is a consensus amongst participants that such strategies, if adopted, would 
provide more effective control than existing strategies. 
The aim is to ensure any recommendations made to TSC or NOJDPAC for 
national endorsement and facilitation of control policy changes in NSW 
are practical and rational within the broader environment in which the 
strategies will operate. This will include some consideration of whether it 
is likely or not that responsibility will be accepted by the appropriate 
authority for the key elements of activities identified as necessary for the 
identified control strategies. If there are any strategies under consideration 
for which implementation is unlikely or inappropriate at this time (for 
reasons other than the disease control objectives), these strategies should 
be deleted at this stage. 
 
2:30 pm Conclusions and Recommendations - Denis Hussey 
 
The aim of this session is to draft a summary of the findings and any 
recommendations of the workshop for submission to TSC and NOJDPAC 
 
3:45 pm Concluding Remarks - John Chudleigh 
 
4:00 pm Close 
 
Participation by all delegates at the final session will be critical to effective 
outcomes from the workshop. Please do not arrange your travel to require 
your departure before 4:00 pm. 
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“THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT” 
 
The workshop will be opened by Mr John Kerin and chaired by Dr Robin Vandegraaff.  
Mr Denis Hussey will act as “facilitator” of the workshop. 
 
The format for this workshop has been modelled roughly on the format used in the United States 
for National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conferences which make critical 
technical recommendations for changes to national human health policies (eg RDA’s for 
nutrients, therapeutic regimes and drug prescribing policies). 
 
Essentially, under this format there are two types of participants in the workshop – “core 
participants” and “non-core participants”.   
 
In the “cut-and-thrust” of the debate on key technical issues in the workshop, core participants 
have priority for whatever time is available, both for asking and answering questions.  
 
Non-core participants however are more than just observers and may be invited to speak at an 
appropriate time by the facilitator, often but not always at the request of a core participant, on 
any particular issue in which the non-core participant has special expertise. However, this is not 
an opportunity for “Dorothy Dix” questions. The facilitator determines who is to speak at any 
time including who will answer any question put by a non-core participant. (The facilitator will 
be well briefed on the background and interests of all participants including non-core 
participants.)  There are also opportunities for questions and statements from non-core 
participants, but priority is given to the core participants. 
 
The focus of this arrangement is always upon allowing the facilitator to obtain decisions and 
recommendations from the meeting based on the consensus of the core participants. The non-
core-participants are only involved in this process to the extent that they contribute to the 
discussion with arguments that are persuasive to the core participants. 
 
This format is very outcome focussed, with a specified requirement in advance of the meeting 
for decisions and recommendations on particular key issues.  
 
Core participants are expected to come to the meeting with an understanding of the outcomes 
expected and the decisions and recommendations to be made, a good knowledge of the 
background to the issues and a willingness to contribute to and endorse the consensus decisions 
that are reached and to make recommendations accordingly. Non-core participants must come 
prepared to contribute to the discussion when asked and well focussed on how to make any 
points they believe to be critical to the debate in the more limited time available to them, but 
with the clear understanding that core participants have priority and this will be strictly 
controlled by the facilitator. . If you are having trouble imagining how it will work, think about 
Geoffrey Robinson’s “Hypotheticals” on your ABC. 
 
To assist the consensus development process, seating at the meeting is carefully planned by the 
facilitator to maximise opportunities for constructive debate from all participants according to 
these rules 
Please accept this notice as a your invitation to the National OJD Control Strategies Workshop.   
 
The proposed agenda for the workshop, a list of invited participants and several briefing papers 
describing some proposals from NSW for change to control policies are attached. 
 
We look forward to your active contribution to this workshop.   
NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON OVINE JOHNE’S 
DISEASE CONTROL STRATEGIES  
17th & 18th April, 2001 – AMA House, Barton ACT 
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PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES FOR 
CONTROL OF OVINE JOHNE’S DISEASE 
 
Prepared by NSW Agriculture – 4th April 2001  
 
 
 
Summary 
 
There is evidence in NSW that, despite the application of measures to reduce spread of OJD 
in accordance with the NOJDP, within and between flock transmission and particularly 
lateral (neighbour) transmission is still occurring at a level which threatens the viability of 
the control aspect of the program in this state.  
 
Lack of short term control in NSW will drastically reduce the number of potential options for 
long term OJD management in Australia. 
 
NSW requires access to new control strategies to reverse the current situation. 
 
New control strategies are needed to: 
¾ reduce prevalence in infected flocks, 
¾ protect uninfected/low-risk flocks and low-risk zones, 
¾ allow increased trading options for low risk sheep from affected flocks, 
¾ encourage producer support and compliance with the program. 
 
Implementation of such strategies will require access to measures such as: 
¾ financially assisted infected flock profiling,  
¾ financially assisted Property Disease Reduction Plans,  
¾ use of vaccine for strategic disease control,  
¾ grading of movement restrictions according to risk. 
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Introduction 
 
Objective number three of the National Ovine Johne’s Disease Control and Evaluation 
Program (NOJDP) is ‘to minimise further spread of OJD during the evaluation phase’. 
 
The National Control Strategies Workshop has been convened to review current OJD control 
strategies, identify deficiencies, and recommend modifications to enhance containment of the 
disease during the control and evaluation phase of the program. 
 
 
Background 
 
Control of ovine Johne’s disease is an essential component of the national program, as 
defined by the Morris Hussey Report, 31 January 1998, and implemented under the NOJDP.  
The recommendations in the report ‘are based on the judgement that the best path forward is 
to implement a collection of measures aimed at containing and progressively reducing 
infection in a manner consistent with the eventual goal of achieving eradication’. However 
Morris Hussey clearly delineated control strategies (Property Disease Eradication Plans - 
PDEPs, and Property Disease Reduction Plans - PDRPs) from spread reduction strategies 
(zoning and movement restriction). 
 
To date spread reduction has been based on: 
¾ surveillance,  
¾ implementation of quarantine measures on all flocks known or suspected of being 
infected, 
¾ zoning - introduced on 1/7/99 to restrict the movement of non-assessed sheep from 
known endemic areas to areas of apparently lower prevalence.  
 
On an individual property level, infected properties are quarantined, and owners have been 
encouraged to consider undergoing a Property Disease Eradication Plan (PDEP) with the aim 
of eliminating all infective organisms/sources of infective organisms from their land and 
flock. In some states assistance measures have been provided to producers undergoing 
PDEPs. 
 
Owners of suspect properties have been encouraged to cooperate with investigations into the 
apparent presence/absence of disease.  Limited incentive is offered in terms of removal of 
restrictions and possible accelerated entry into the MAP where the investigation returns 
negative results. 
 
In addition, owners of infected properties who have not been able to undertake a PDEP have 
been encouraged to undertake disease management or disease reduction measures, including 
enterprise change, strategic culling, pasture management, nutritional and breeding 
management and parasite control programs, all designed to reduce the impact of OJD on their 
enterprise. 
 
However despite the application and/or enforcement of all the above measures, there is now 
clear evidence of continued spread of infection within New South Wales including: 
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¾ spread by lateral transmission from identified infected properties to neighbouring land 
and flocks, 
¾ spread by lateral transmission from as yet unidentified infected properties to 
neighbouring land and flocks, 
¾ dissemination by forward movement from as yet unidentified infected properties. 
 
 
Principles of Control 
 
Effective control of OJD is dependent on: 
 
¾ implementation of effective measures to limit spread through movement of sheep; 
¾ implementation of effective measures to limit spread between neighbouring 
properties; 
¾ support of producers for the program and compliance with measures implemented. 
 
Measures in low prevalence regions/zones should be directed at early identification of 
infected flocks, to allow prompt action to identify other at-risk flocks and limit further spread. 
In higher prevalence zones identification of infected flocks is less critical, and measures 
should be directed at minimising spread from infected properties (both known and unknown), 
protecting identified low-risk flocks and enhancing trading opportunities for low risk 
flocks/mobs.  
 
Thus, any control program must be based on a combination of: 
¾ disease control on individual infected farms to reduce prevalence, and  
¾ movement controls on infected farms and between zones of different prevalence to 
minimise spread by movements of sheep.  
At the same time, the measures must receive the support of affected producers and their 
compliance with the program for it to succeed. This is a major failing of the current highly 
restrictive approach to OJD.  
 
A risk-based approach to control is essential, as a no-risk approach is doomed to failure. 
There will always be some risk associated with any measures used, and it is essential that the 
likely risks associated with the various measures are carefully assessed and only measures 
that have an acceptable level of risk are implemented. 
 
 
Potential strategies for control of OJD 
 
The following strategies are or may be available for the control of OJD. Different 
combinations of strategies are likely to be applicable for use in different zones/regions, and 
programs should be designed to meet the control objectives for each zone. This list is not 
exhaustive. 
 
¾ Restrictions on the movement of non-assured sheep between zones 
¾ A risk-based approach to movement controls for infected/suspect flocks 
¾ On-going surveillance programs for detection of infected flocks 
¾ Prompt and thorough investigation of flocks identified by tracing or other means of 
surveillance 
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¾ Surveillance of neighbours of infected flocks to ensure early detection and 
implementation of control measures 
¾ Subsidised MAP/assurance testing to identify low-risk flocks 
¾ Implementation of disease reduction plans to reduce prevalence on infected farms 
¾ Continued strict control over the use of vaccine – eligibility, identification of 
vaccinates, quarantine 
¾ Vaccination or depopulation of infected flocks 
¾ Pre-emptive vaccination or depopulation of high-risk suspect flocks 
¾ Vaccination (compulsory or voluntary) of known infected and/or suspect flocks 
¾ Vaccination (compulsory or voluntary) of flocks neighbouring known infected flocks 
¾ Vaccination (compulsory or voluntary) of all flocks in the district/zone/catchment  
¾ Use of adult vaccination for rapid reduction in level of excretion 
¾ Use of voluntary vendor declarations when selling/purchasing sheep within a zone 
¾ Development of options for trading between vaccinating flocks 
¾ Development of group strategies to work together to control and/or eliminate the 
disease on an area/catchment basis 
¾ Financial assistance for affected producers. 
 
 
Limitations on proposed control measures 
 
The following limitations on proposed control measures have been identified: 
 
Limitation Proposed measures to overcome 
Availability of vaccine for 
wider use in RZ 
♦ Negotiate amendments to NRA permit 
♦ Eventually achieve Australian registration of the vaccine 
Use of vaccine in CZ/PPZ/PZ ♦ Negotiate amendments to SD&Rs 
Use of vaccine in adults ♦ Ongoing research project (more intensive research on 
individual animal responses/outcomes required) 
Producer support/compliance ♦ Financial support 
♦ Assistance with developing group strategies and 
management options 
♦ Wider availability and use of vaccine 
♦ Increased trading options 
♦ Communication, consultation, education 
Perception that disease is of 
little consequence 
♦ Document mortalities and production losses 
Implementation of disease 
reduction measures 
♦ Infected flock profiling and increased trading options for 
low risk mobs (especially for studs) 
♦ Financial assistance to undertake disease reduction 
measures 
♦ Assistance for genetic salvage on studs 
Early detection of flocks in 
low-prevalence regions 
 
 
 
♦ Targeted surveillance programs (tracing) 
♦ Non-targeted/random surveillance 
(MAP/surveys/abattoir surveillance) 
♦ Use of most sensitive tests (PFC) 
♦ Financial support for affected producers 
Ongoing spread through ♦ Trade in low risk/vaccinated sheep only 
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permitted movements from 
infected/suspect flocks 
♦ Trade between vaccinating properties only 
♦ Infected flock profiles to identify low-risk sheep 
Ongoing spread between zones 
 
 
 
♦ Improved compliance with movement restrictions 
♦ Auditing of movements 
♦ Zoning according to known prevalence and major sheep 
movement patterns 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Current control measures used under the National program are not preventing continuing 
spread of OJD, particularly ‘local spread’ around infected flocks. 
 
New control strategies are needed to: 
¾ reduce prevalence in infected flocks, 
¾ protect uninfected/low-risk flocks and low-risk zones, 
¾ allow increased trading options for low risk sheep from affected flocks, 
¾ encourage producer support and compliance with the program. 
 
Such strategies are interdependent and, in terms of disease control, synergistic. Basic 
measures such as: 
¾ financial assistance to infected producers for profiling of prevalence and 
implementation of disease reduction measures  
¾ access to vaccine where appropriate as part of an on-property disease reduction plan to 
reduce the impact of disease and the level of environmental contamination  
¾ grading movement restrictions according to risk 
are seen as essential components of any future regional OJD control program where disease 
incidence or socio/economic factors preclude implementation of financially assisted 
destocking.  
 
end 
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Example of local spread of OJD in NSW 
 
Prepared by NSW Agriculture from data supplied by Rural Lands Protection Boards 
 
 
 
 
The attached maps relate to a cluster of OJD infected properties in the southwest slopes area of NSW. 
The cluster includes 15 properties that are either known or presumed to be infected with OJD. 
Investigations to date have identified only one potential source of infection for this cluster, with the 
remaining properties infected through local spread, either by environmental spread between properties 
in water or air, or through shared facilities/grazing (e.g. on roads) or straying of sheep. 
 
The history of the cluster is as follows: 
 
Property Year OJD 
confirmed 
Comment 
X 1997 Index property, introduced sheep from infected property at 
Goulburn in 1988, no other apparent source 
1 1998 Probably infected from X, no other apparent source 
2 1998 Probably infected from X, related to owner of X, no record of 
introduction from alternate likely source  
3 1998 Probably infected from X, no other apparent source 
4 2000 Probably infected from X, no other apparent source 
5 1998 Shared facilities with property 3, no other apparent source 
6 2000 Purchased land from property 5, no other apparent source 
7 & 8 2000 Properties run together, abattoir trace in 2000, histo positive 12/00 
on property 8, either neighbour spread or infected from property 7, 
no other apparent source 
9 2000 Probably infected from either property 2 or property 5, no other 
apparent source 
10 2000 Infected by sheep transfer from property 2 (same owner) 
11 2001 PFC positive following abattoir trace in 2000 
12 2001 PFC positive following abattoir trace in 2000 
13 2000 Abattoir trace  
14 2001 PFC positive 3/01 following abattoir trace in 2000, no other 
apparent source 
15 2000 PFC positive 3/01 following abattoir trace (mixed lot), no other 
apparent source  
 
 2
Additional notes: 
 
♦ Property X is close to the bottom of the catchment, suggesting that water-borne spread has not 
been a major feature in this cluster, although it cannot be ruled out between individual properties 
(see relief map). 
♦ Property 16 was tested for OJD in 1998 with one seroreactor which was negative on 
histopathology. No further testing has been undertaken. 
♦ Property 17 was tested for OJD in 1998 with several seroreactors, of which two were “suggestive” 
and one was negative on histopathology. The property has since destocked and restocked with 
different sheep, delaying further testing to clarify the status of the property. 
♦ The eastern boundary of Properties 2, 9 & 10 is a major road. 
♦ The property to the east of Property 1 is mainly cropping with limited summer grazing only. 
♦ Properties 7 & 13 extend into a different catchment. 
♦ To date no abattoir traces, no reports of clinical disease and no positive investigations on 
surrounding sheep properties.  Some surrounding properties are cattle/cropping or have only 
recently stocked with sheep. Several others have been sampled and are awaiting PFC results. 
♦ Properties were identified variously by abattoir surveillance, as neighbours or by notification of 
suspect cases. 
 
END 
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PROPOSED MODEL FOR CONTROL OF OVINE 
JOHNE’S DISEASE IN NEW SOUTH 
 
Prepared by NSW Agriculture – 4th April 2001  
 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
In response to evidence of continued spread of OJD in NSW, it is proposed that the state be 
managed, for the purpose of OJD control, in three regions with policy graded according to 
known disease prevalence in each region. 
 
Features of the model common to all regions include: 
 
¾ Continuation of surveillance and assurance programs.  
 
¾ Pooled Faecal Culture will be the standard screening test for both surveillance and 
assurance. 
 
¾ Profiling of prevalence on infected properties, and implementation of Property Disease 
Reduction Plans (PDRP), will underpin control activities. 
 
¾ Vaccine will be required for strategic disease control as well as alleviation of losses. 
 
¾ Pathways to implement and then verify disease elimination other than by total destocking 
will be available. 
 
¾ Movement of sheep from infected properties not implementing PDRPs will be restricted to 
slaughter only.  
 
Features of the model which differ for each region include: 
 
¾ Emphasis on disease exclusion or detection/elimination in the low prevalence (Proposed 
Protected Zone – PPZ) region, including increased surveillance and mandatory 
monitoring of high risk flocks.  
 
¾ Emphasis on disease reduction and containment in the moderate prevalence (Control 
Zone - CZ) region. 
 
¾ Emphasis on disease reduction, particularly on a group or catchment basis, in the high 
prevalence (Residual Zone - RZ) region. 
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¾ Suspect properties will be able to progress status on the basis of an immediate negative 
investigation in the RZ, and on the basis of a negative investigation taking into account 
time constraints, in the CZ and PPZ. 
 
¾ Infected properties implementing PDRPs will be able to trade low risk (including 
vaccinated) sheep according to the following table. 
 
Movements of low risk (including vaccinated) sheep from infected properties 
Region of origin Region and property of destination 
 RZ CZ PPZ 
RZ Infected and Suspect 
properties 
Infected properties 
(CVO approval) 
Nil 
CZ Infected and Suspect 
properties 
Infected properties 
(CVO approval) 
Nil 
PPZ Infected and Suspect 
properties 
Infected properties 
(CVO approval) 
Infected properties* 
(CVO approval) 
*  exceptional circumstances only 
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Introduction 
 
Evidence of continuing spread of OJD in NSW, particularly lateral spread within infected 
foci, demonstrates the need for a revised approach to disease control.  This paper outlines the 
proposed model for the future management of OJD in NSW.  The model divides NSW into 
three regions based on known prevalence of OJD (see Epidemiological assessment of ovine 
Johne’s disease in New South Wales, Evan Sergeant for NSW Agriculture, February 2001).  
The policy for control/exclusion of infection is graded accordingly, and there is a requirement 
for on-going revision of regional boundaries in response to altering circumstances.  The 
model defines the regional or zone criteria, and highlights the major proposed policy changes. 
 
 
Principles 
 
NSW will effectively be divided into three regions: 
 
 RESIDUAL (HIGH PREVALENCE ZONE) - RZ 
 
 CONTROL (MODERATE PREVALENCE/BUFFER ZONE) - CZ 
 
 PROPOSED PROTECTED (APPARENT LOW PREVALENCE ZONE) - PPZ 
 
For the purposes of interstate movements, the low prevalence Proposed Protected Zone (PPZ) 
will continue to operate in the short term as part of the Control Zone (CZ).   
 
However, if other parts of the eastern Australian CZ do not progress to Protected Zone (PZ) 
as expected by July 2002, consideration may be given to the option of imposing movement 
restrictions into the PPZ from CZ areas elsewhere in  NSW or interstate where there is known 
higher prevalence of infection and/or low surveillance activity. 
 
Within NSW itself, the minimum unit for implementation of zoning will be an RLPB division 
or equivalent.  Placement of zone boundaries will be contingent on factors including previous 
and present trading patterns, known prevalence and producer attitude, and will also take into 
account future trade requirements and potential ability to meet zone criteria. 
 
 
 RESIDUAL (HIGH PREVALENCE ZONE) - RZ 
 
Zone Criteria 
¾ documented high prevalence of infection 
¾ likely true flock prevalence > 30% 
¾ likely high proportion of early infected flocks 
¾ evidence of high within-flock prevalence on many properties 
¾ strong local producer demand for access to disease control strategies  
¾ evidence of continuing spread of infection within and between flocks in the region 
¾ increasing flock mortalities causing socioeconomic hardship throughout the region 
¾ loss of trading options causing socioeconomic hardship throughout the region 
 
Policy 
¾ containment within the zone  
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¾ enhanced on-property disease reduction  
¾ increased trading options for low-risk sheep 
 
Surveillance 
¾ on-going surveillance with priority given to abattoir surveillance 
¾ flocks identified by tracing able to progress immediately from Suspect to a higher 
status on the basis of a negative investigation 
 
Testing 
¾ use of pooled faecal culture (PFC) for all flock screening tests unless otherwise 
approved, on a case by case basis, by the NSW OJD State Coordinator  
¾ surveillance and assurance status only able to be progressed by negative flock PFC 
 
Assurance 
¾ MAP participation, testing to MAP standard and check testing strongly encouraged 
and subsidised by the national program/state industry 
¾ testing of potentially high risk neighbours to MAP assured flocks may become 
mandatory   
 
On-property Disease Elimination/Control for Infected Properties 
¾ voluntary Property Disease Eradication Plans (PDEP) only encouraged where 
reinfection from neighbours is not considered to be a major factor 
¾ implementation of Property Disease Reduction Plans (PDRP) strongly encouraged 
¾ vaccination permitted for strategic control and/or alleviation of future losses on all 
quarantined infected properties, with CVO approval, as a component of a PDRP 
¾ profiling of on-property prevalence for all infected properties supported by continued 
abattoir surveillance, and in the case of MAP flocks and studs augmented by on-farm 
testing 
¾ pathways to test out of infected status available where infection has been identified but 
there is subsequently little or no evidence of transmission within the flock 
¾ pathways to test out of infected status available where there is evidence that infection 
which may have previously transmitted within the flock is no longer present following 
implementation of PDRP 
 
Movements from Infected Properties 
¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted from infected 
properties implementing PDRPs to infected and suspect properties within the RZ 
¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted to infected properties 
within the CZ with CVO approval 
¾ movements of stock from infected properties not implementing PDRP, to slaughter 
only 
 
 
 
 
 CONTROL (MODERATE PREVALENCE/BUFFER ZONE) - CZ 
 
Zone Criteria 
¾ documented moderate prevalence of infection 
¾ likely true flock prevalence < 15% 
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¾ likely moderate proportion of early infected flocks 
¾ evidence of high within flock prevalence on some properties 
¾ strong local producer demand for access to disease exclusion and control strategies  
¾ presence of infected foci not adjacent to the RZ with possible evidence of continuing 
spread of infection within and between properties in those foci 
¾ no evidence of independent foci of infection not related to the introduction of sheep 
from the high prevalence regions 
¾ increasing flock mortalities causing socioeconomic hardship 
¾ loss of trading options causing socioeconomic hardship 
 
Policy 
¾ containment and disease reduction/elimination within the infected foci  
¾ surveillance and early detection of unidentified/new infections 
 
Surveillance 
¾ on-going surveillance with priority given to abattoir surveillance, tracing ex RZ and 
neighbour investigations 
¾ suspect status maintained until investigation is able to establish presence or likely 
absence of infection 
¾ monitoring of high risk flocks may become mandatory 
 
Testing 
¾ use of pooled faecal culture (PFC) for all flock screening tests unless otherwise 
approved, on a case by case basis, by the NSW OJD State Coordinator  
¾ surveillance and assurance status only able to be progressed by negative PFC 
 
Assurance 
¾ MAP participation strongly encouraged and subsidised by the national program 
 
On-property Disease Elimination/Control for Infected Properties 
¾ voluntary Property Disease Eradication Plans (PDEP) only encouraged where 
reinfection by neighbours is not considered to be a major factor 
¾ implementation of Property Disease Reduction Plans (PDRP) strongly encouraged 
¾ vaccination permitted for strategic control and/or alleviation of future losses on all 
infected properties, with CVO approval following VetComm endorsement on a district 
basis, as a component of a PDRP 
¾ profiling of on-property prevalence for all infected properties supported by continued 
abattoir surveillance, and in the case of MAP flocks and studs augmented by on-farm 
testing 
¾ pathways to test out of infected status available where infection has been identified but 
there is subsequently little or no evidence of transmission within the flock 
¾ pathways to test out of infected status available where there is evidence that infection 
which may have previously transmitted within the flock is no longer present following 
implementation of PDRP 
 
Movements from Infected Properties 
¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted from infected CZ 
properties implementing PDRPs to infected and suspect properties in the RZ 
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¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted from infected CZ 
properties implementing PDRPs to other infected properties in the CZ with CVO 
approval 
¾ movements of stock from infected properties not implementing PDRPs, permitted to 
slaughter only 
 
 
 
 PROPOSED PROTECTED (APPARENT LOW PREVALENCE ZONE) - PPZ 
 
Zone Criteria 
¾ evidence to support likely low prevalence of infection 
¾ likely flock prevalence < 0.5% 
¾ strong local producer demand for access to disease exclusion and control strategies  
¾ no evidence of independent foci of infection not related to the introduction of sheep 
from the high or moderate prevalence regions 
¾ should be separated from any part of the RZ by a section of the CZ 
¾ evidence of producer support for eventual progression to Protected Zone (PZ) status, 
subject to revision of PZ criteria.  
 
Policy 
¾ containment of any identified infection 
¾ immediate implementation of disease reduction/elimination measures on any 
identified infected property 
¾ surveillance and early detection of previously unidentified/new infections 
¾ regular monitoring of all neighbours of identified infected properties 
 
Surveillance 
¾ increased level of surveillance with priority given to ill thrift investigations, abattoir 
surveillance, tracing, annual neighbour investigations, check test surveys, other 
surveys 
¾ suspect status maintained until investigation is able to establish presence or likely 
absence of infection 
¾ monitoring of high risk flocks mandatory 
 
Testing 
¾ use of pooled faecal culture (PFC) for all screening tests unless otherwise approved, 
on a case by case basis, by the NSW OJD State Coordinator  
¾ surveillance and assurance status only able to be progressed by negative PFC  
 
Assurance 
¾ MAP participation and check testing strongly encouraged and subsidised by the 
national program 
 
On-property Disease Elimination/Control for Infected Properties 
¾ voluntary Property Disease Eradication Plans (PDEP) strongly encouraged  
¾ in the absence of PDEP, implementation of Property Disease Reduction Plans (PDRP) 
is mandatory 
¾ vaccination permitted for strategic control and/or alleviation of future losses with 
CVO and  VetComm approval on a case by case basis, as a component of a PDRP 
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¾ profiling of on-property infection supported by abattoir surveillance, and in the case of 
MAP flocks and studs augmented by on-farm testing  
¾ pathways to test out of infected status available where infection has been identified but 
there is subsequently little or no evidence of transmission within the flock 
¾ pathways to test out of infected status available where there is evidence that infection 
which may have previously transmitted within the flock is no longer present following 
implementation of PDRP 
 
Movements from Infected Properties 
¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted from infected PPZ 
properties implementing PDRPs to infected and suspect properties in the RZ 
¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted from infected PPZ 
properties implementing PDRPs to infected properties in the CZ, with CVO approval 
¾ regulated trade of low risk stock, including vaccinates, permitted from infected PPZ 
properties implementing PDRPs to other infected properties in the PPZ in exceptional 
circumstances, with CVO approval 
¾ movements of stock from infected properties not implementing PDRPs, permitted to 
slaughter only 
 
end 
1Epidemiological assessment of ovine Johne’s disease
in New South Wales
Prepared by Evan Sergeant for NSW Agriculture February 2001
Executive Summary
Data from the ovine Johne’s disease surveillance program was analysed to estimate the current known and
projected prevalence of ovine Johne’s disease infected flocks in NSW. The data came from three main sources:
property status and tracing data from Rural Lands Protection Boards; Laboratory testing data from NSW
Agriculture’s laboratory information system; and abattoir surveillance data from NSW Agriculture’s abattoir
surveillance database.
For the purpose of this analysis Rural Lands Protection Districts in NSW were allocated to one of three
regions, on the basis of the prevalence of known infected flocks in each District at 31 December 2000. The
high prevalence region comprised Central Tablelands and Goulburn districts, the moderate prevalence region
comprised the remaining districts in the central and southern tablelands, and the south-west slopes and eastern
Riverina areas, while the low prevalence region comprised the rest of NSW.
Key findings of this analysis were:
¨ The current prevalence of known infected flocks in these three regions was 0.07%, 1.6% and 9% for the
low, moderate and high prevalence regions respectively;
 
¨ The projected current  true prevalence of infected flocks in these regions was <1.2%, 8 – 14% and 30 –
39%, with an overall estimated prevalence in NSW of about 6 – 8% (2000 – 3000 flocks);
 
¨ The data suggests that within the moderate prevalence region prevalence may be higher in Braidwood,
Yass and Young districts than in the other districts in this region;
 
¨ The current and projected distribution of infected flocks matches closely the pattern of sheep movements
from known infected flocks;
 
¨ There was no evidence of any independent foci of infection not related to the introduction of infected
sheep from higher prevalence districts;
 
¨ The major risk factor for OJD infection was proximity to known infected flocks – properties with one or
more known infected neighbours were at a much greater risk of infection than properties with no infected
neighbours;
 
¨ The major risk factor for spread of infection between districts was the movement of infected sheep;
 
¨ The current regulatory program is having little if any impact on spread between neighbouring properties;
 
¨ It should be assumed that M a paratuberculosis will survive and spread in any sheep-raising area of NSW
(and Australia), although incidence of clinical disease may vary between regions;
 
¨ If effective measures to prevent further spread of disease and to identify new infected properties in low-
prevalence regions are not implemented it is likely that the disease will be endemic in most of NSW
within 15-20 years, with flock-prevalence up to or exceeding 10% in many districts;
All three data sources used in this analysis suffer from numerous potential and actual biases. In addition, the
analysis relies on a number of assumptions that may or may not be valid. Therefore, these results represent
indicative rather than definitive estimates, and should be interpreted with some caution. However, despite these
2limitations, all three data sources supported the general thrust of these results. That is, there was clear evidence
of clustering of the disease, a gradation of prevalence across the state, and that many areas are likely to have
few if any infected flocks.
Introduction
Ovine Johne's disease (OJD) was first diagnosed in Australia in 1980, in central New South Wales (Seaman et
al., 1981). Since that time it has spread progressively either through movement of sheep or from separate
introductions from overseas or another interstate focus, so that by September 2000 more than 800 infected
flocks had been reported in five of Australia’s seven States (S rgeant, in press). Despite this, there are still
large areas of Australia where the disease has never been diagnosed, or has been seen only in introduced sheep.
A national ovine Johne's disease control program (NOJDP) has been implemented to limit further spread of the
disease while research continues to evaluate possible future control or eradication strategies (Allworth and
Kennedy, 2000). The NOJDP is planned to run for 6 years, from 1998 to 2004, with a mid-term review in mid-
2001.
Critical elements of the NOJDP are surveillance to detect infected flocks, and a market assurance program
(SheepMAP) to identify flocks with a low risk of being infected, as a source of disease free sheep for
commercial producers and as replacements for infected flocks undergoing eradication. Traditionally in
Australia, testing for paratuberculosis has relied on serology using the agar gel immunodiffusion test (AGID),
with any reactors submitted to postmortem and histological examination to confirm or exclude infection
(Whittington and Sergeant, in press; Sergeant, in press). More recently, techniques have been developed to
allow reliable culture of ovine strains of M a paratuberculosis from tissues and faeces of infected animals
(Whittington et al., 1998; Whittington et al., 1999). This technology has been extended further by the
development of pooled faecal culture (PFC) as a flock-screening test for paratuberculosis (Whit ington et al.,
2000). PFC has been used routinely for OJD surveillance in New South Wales since 1999. At the same time,
abattoir surveillance has also been introduced as an additional surveillance tool for detection of OJD.
Prior to 1996 OJD was essentially limited to NSW, and surveillance relied exclusively on owner reporting of
suspect clinical cases. Since 1996, surveillance for OJD has increased and has relied primarily on the testing of
high-risk flocks identified by tracing the movement of sheep onto and off infected properties, or as neighbours
of infected properties. As a result, surveillance has concentrated on properties in known infected areas, or that
have purchased sheep from these areas. Since mid-1997, market assurance testing has provided additional
surveillance data, including some data for areas where little testing had been done previously. As a result of the
increased level of surveillance, particularly during the interim surveillance program, the number of infected
flocks in NSW increased dramatically from 158 at the end of 1996 to 599 by the end of 2000.
This report describes the epidemiological analysis of surveillance data for OJD in NSW. The specific objectives
of the analysis were to:
1. Describe the current known prevalence and distribution of OJD in NSW;
2. Estimate the likely overall distribution and prevalence of OJD infected flocks in NSW;
3. Identify important risk factors in the spread of OJD and evaluate their relative importance;
4. Estimate the past and current rate of spread of OJD between flocks and zones/regions;
5. Review the potential spread and distribution of OJD in NSW if unchecked;
6. Identify possible control strategies to minimise the ongoing spread of OJD; and
7. Make recommendations as to alternative strategies for future control and surveillance for OJD in NSW.
Current prevalence and distribution of known infected flocks in NSW
The current prevalence of known infected (and suspected/under surveillance) flocks in NSW was calculated
from data provided by Rural Lands Protection Boards Board (see Table 13, Map1). Prevalence by RLPB
ranged from 0% (29 districts) to 10% in Central Tablelands. Because these estimates are based on known
infected flocks identified by notification, tracing or abattoir surveillance these estimates will underestimate the
true prevalence to a variable degree between districts.
To facilitate further analysis of the data, districts were allocated to one of three ‘regions’ based on their known
prevalence of OJD. Districts with less than 0.5% known infected flocks were allocated to ‘low-prevalence’ (LP)
3regions, districts with 0.5% to 5% were ‘moderate-prevalence’ (MP) and districts with >5% known infected
flocks were ‘high-prevalence’ (HP) regions. There were two districts in the high prevalence region, 10 in the
moderate prevalence region and 36 in the low prevalence region (see Table 1, Map 2). This regional break-up
is intended for convenience of analysis and is not intended to dictate future zone boundaries.
Based on the available data, the regional prevalence of known infected flocks was estimated as 0.07%, 1.6%
and 9% for low, moderate and high prevalence regions respectively, and the overall prevalence across NSW
was 1.6%. A further 2.2% of flocks are suspect, and 6% are under surveillance.
Table 1: Prevalence of known infected flocks by region
Region Districts Infected
flocks
Total
flocks
Prevalence
LP 36 11 16783 0.07%
MP 10 186 11704 1.6%
HP 2 309 3388 9%
Total 48 506 31875 1.6%
Analysis of laboratory results
The results of all laboratory testing undertaken between 1 April 1998 and 31 December 2000 were analysed.
Data on the number of tests undertaken and the number of tests positive were analysed by RLPB district and by
region for all gel tests, histology and pooled faecal culture. For gel tests and histology each test represents one
animal, whereas for pooled faecal culture each test represents a pool of normally 50 animals. The results of this
analysis are shown in Tables 2 and 14. Overall 443,321 gel tests have been undertaken, with about 0.5%
positive, 2,486 histological examinations with 23% positive, and 2,733 faecal pools with 6.3% positive.
Overall, 25% of submissions for serology had one or more positives, 32% of submissions for histology were
positive and 10% of submissions for pooled faecal culture were positive. The percentage of positive results
increased with the prevalence of infection in the region of origin for all tests. About 20% of all tests were from
the low-prevalence region, with only 0.2% of gel tests, 0.8% of faecal pools and 6% of histological
examinations positive, well below the levels for the other regions.
Table 2: Summary of laboratory results by region
Test Region Submissions % +ve Tests % +ve
Gel LP 973 7% 78795 0.2%
Gel MP 2017 25% 272100 0.4%
Gel HP 752 47% 92426 1.0%
Gel Total 3742 25% 443321 0.5%
Histology LP 133 9% 349 6%
Histology MP 631 25% 1518 17%
Histology HP 344 52% 619 48%
Histology Total 1108 32% 2486 23%
PFC LP 220 1.4% 796 0.8%
PFC MP 436 11% 1541 7%
PFC HP 95 26% 396 16%
PFC Total 751 10% 2733 6%
Results of property investigations
All laboratory submissions that could be identified to a unique property identifier were summarised for that
property, to give a total number of tests per property for serology, histology and PFC, as well as whether they
were positive on either histology or pooled faecal culture. Any properties with a positive histology or PFC
result were regarded as positive investigations. These property investigations were summarised by region and
the result of the investigation (see Table 3). Overall, 38% of investigations on properties in the high-
prevalence region were positive, compared to 14% and 1.8% in the moderate- and low-prevalence regions
respectively. Across all regions 16% of properties investigated were positive on either histology or PFC or
4both. A considerable volume of testing which could not be identified to a specific property was excluded from
this analysis.
Table 3: Summary of investigations by region for period 1/4/1998 to 31/12/2000
Region # Investigations# positive % positive
LP 393 7 1.8%
MP 1105 154 14%
HP 370 142 38%
Total 1868 303 16%
These results are based on an analysis of laboratory investigations only, and therefore do not provide an
unbiased estimate of the true prevalence of OJD in NSW. Nevertheless, they do provide an indicator of the
relative frequency of diagnosis between regions. Generally, the majority of these investigations were
undertaken in ‘high-risk’ flocks identified by tracing or as neighbours to known infected flocks, while the
balance were mainly in flocks seeking entry to the SheepMAP. Thus, these estimates are likely to over-estimate
the true prevalence of infected flocks to an unknown extent.
Table 4 shows the outcome of investigations by region and the quarter in which the investigation commenced.
There is no obvious temporal pattern, with the proportion of positive investigations varying considerable
between quarters. A decline in the proportion of positive investigations over time could indicate that control
measures have been effective in slowing spread and that surveillance activities have ‘caught up’ to the spread
that has occurred in the past. However, as surveillance is targeted at high-risk flocks, and particularly at flocks
positive on abattoir surveillance in the last 6-12 months, the proportion of positive flocks would be expected to
remain high. At this stage there is no specific evidence that control measures are failing to contain spread
occurring by trading movements.
Table 4: Percentage of positive investigations by region and quarter
Region
Year Quarter LP MP HP Total
1998 Qtr2 0.0% 12% 41% 14%
Qtr3 2.5% 15% 37% 19%
Qtr4 1.8% 15% 29% 14%
1999 Qtr1 7.7% 8% 36% 11%
Qtr2 16.7% 7% 33% 10%
Qtr3 11.1% 16% 67% 23%
Qtr4 0.0% 13% 71% 17%
2000 Qtr1 0.0% 23% 25% 15%
Qtr2 0.0% 20% 57% 19%
Qtr3 0.0% 18% 50% 17%
Qtr4 0.0% 11% 29% 12%
Total 1.8% 14% 38% 16%
Abattoir surveillance results
The results of abattoir surveillance undertaken in NSW from November 1999 to 31 December 2000 were
collated and analysed. Only lines that were identified to a single Rural Lands Protection Board district were
included in the analysis. Tables 5 & 15 and Maps 3 & 4 summarise the results of abattoir surveillance by
region and district. Overall, 0.3% of lines from low-prevalence regions were positive or inconclusive
(suggestive lesions identified but no acid-fast bacilli observed), compared to 7% and 30% of lines from
moderate and high prevalence regions. At an individual district level, Yass, Braidwood and Young districts all
had a substantially higher detection rate than other districts in their region, suggesting that these districts may
have a prevalence intermediate between the high-prevalence region and the other districts in the moderate-
prevalence region.
5This data may also be substantially biased by the fact that not all lines have been confirmed to their district or
property of origin and many properties may have had multiple lines examined. Thus the proportion of positive
lines is only a crude measure of prevalence in a district or region. In addition, the flock- (or line-) sensitivity of
abattoir surveillance is unknown, but is likely to be higher in high prevalence areas than low prevalence areas.
Thus the proportion of positive lines will underestimate the true prevalence of infected flocks to a variable
extent, depending on the district of origin and other factors (see section on estimated true flock-prevalence
below). Despite these limitations, it is apparent that nearly half the lines examined by abattoir surveillance
have been from the low-prevalence region, with only 13 positive and two inconclusive lines out of 4,383 lines
examined.
Table 5: Summary of abattoir surveillance by region
Region +ve inc -ve Total % +ve
Low-prevalence 13 2 4368 4383 0.3%
Moderate-prevalence 263 18 3646 3927 7.2%
High-prevalence 394 23 971 1388 30%
670 43 8985 9698 7%
Prevalence estimation
Because of the insidious nature of the disease, and the large proportion of infected animals that are sub-clinical
carriers, prevalence of JD is very difficult to estimate reliably and there are thus few published estimates of
prevalence of paratuberculosis in sheep, either at the individual or flock level. Any estimates are also likely to
substantially underestimate the true prevalence of the disease unless adjusted for the lack of sensitivity of the
tests used.
Estimation of the prevalence of OJD is further complicated by the lack of sensitivity of available screening
tests. At an individual level this is particularly of concern, as sero-prevalence estimates significantly
underestimate the true prevalence of infected animals. Application of tests at a flock level reduces the bias
somewhat due to the use of large sample sizes. However, even using large sample sizes the tests still have less
than 100% flock-sensitivity. Prevalence estimates can be adjusted for the assumed sensitivity of the test,
although this is further complicated by the fact that the flock sensitivity of a test is generally not known with
any high degree of confidence, and may vary between flocks and regions, thus introducing further uncertainty
into any prevalence estimates. Therefore, adjusted prevalence estimates are less precise than would normally be
expected for a given sample size.
Performance of diagnostic/screening tests for OJD
Currently available flock-screening tests in Australia include serology (primarily AGID test), pooled faecal
culture and abattoir surveillance. Flocks/animals with a positive screening test are generally followed up with a
definitive test to confirm or exclude infection. Definitive tests for OJD currently include histopathology and
tissue culture. At present pooled faecal culture is used only as a screening test, however it may also be used as a
repeat test to confirm infection in previously pfc positive flocks (i.e. two pfc positive results are regarded as
definitive). Flocks with a positive abattoir surveillance result are also subjected to further testing using serology
and/or PFC and/or histology to confirm the presence of infection.
The performance of pfc and serology have been extensively reviewed and discussed elsewhere (Whittington et
al., 2000; Whittington and Sergeant, in press;Kalis CHJ et al., 2000). Briefly, serology has a low and variable
sensitivity and relatively high specificity (~99.9% for AGID). Animal-level sensitivity of serological tests is
generally poor early in the course of infection, and increases as infection progresses, ranging from <10% in
very early latent infections to >80% in clinical cases, and averaging about 25% in unselected sheep from
infected properties (Marshall DJ et al., 1996; Huchzermeyer HF and Bastianello SS, 1991). The sensitivity of
the AGID and ELISA are generally comparable, although they tend to detect slightly different populations of
infected animals. The specificity of the ELISA tends to be lower than the AGID, depending on the cut-off
chosen.
At a flock-level, recommended sample sizes for surveillance and assurance testing have been chosen to provide
a 95% flock-sensitivity for a prevalence of 2%, assuming an animal-level sensitivity of 30% for serology and
6about 40% for pooled faecal culture. Evaluation of the flock-level performance of the two tests used in parallel
in 296 flocks in NSW suggest that serology is not achieving the desired flock-sensitivity, and that pfc is
performing much better. In flocks with an estimated prevalence ³ 2% pooled culture had an estimated flock-
sensitivity of 96% compared to 85% for serology, while in flocks with a prevalence < 2% the estimated flock-
sensitivities were 82% and 33% respectively (Serg ant et al., submitted.).
The flock-level sensitivity of abattoir surveillance is still not well characterised and is affected by a number of
factors:
· animal-level sensitivity (affected by stage of disease in flock/animal);
· animal-level specificity;
· within-flock prevalence;
· distribution of the disease in the flock;
· representativeness of the line as a sample of the flock;
· number of animals sampled; and
· cut-off number of reactors to determine a positive result (in this case 1).
 
 Therefore, flock-sensitivity will vary from flock to flock according to the above factors. At a regional or group
level, flock-sensitivity is the proportion of infected flocks that are detected, and is affected by the range of
prevalence and test performances in those flocks. Therefore, ‘average’ flock-sensitivity will also vary between
regions, depending on these factors. Estimates from inspection of lines from known infected flocks range from
30% to 90% (unpublished data). Simulation studies also suggest that the flock-sensitivity of abattoir
surveillance is probably as low as 30 - 35% in low prevalence areas/flocks and > 90% in high prevalence
areas/flocks (unpublished).
 
 As the sensitivity of a flock test is not a fixed value, performance of all screening tests will vary between flocks
and regions, making estimation of sample sizes difficult and reducing overall confidence in prevalence
estimates.
 
 
 Estimated true flock-prevalence from surveillance data
 The likely true prevalence of infected flocks was estimated from the available surveillance data. For each
region, the total number of current infected, suspect and under surveillance flocks was determined from data
provided by Rural Lands Protection Boards, as well as the numbers of properties identified as neighbours or
forward traces from known infected properties and that did not have a status allocated. The estimated total
number of infected flocks was calculated as the current number of infected flocks, plus a proportion of suspect
and unidentified forward traced flocks, plus a proportion of under surveillance and unidentified neighbour
flocks.
 
 The values used to multiply the numbers of suspect, under surveillance and traced flocks were based on an
analysis of tracing data to estimate the proportion of traced flocks that are likely to be infected (see Tables 9 &
10). These values were entered as BetaPert (smoothed triangular) probability distributions in an @Risk
simulation model, with minimum, most likely and maximum values as shown in Table 6. The @Risk model
was run for 1000 iterations to generate a probability distribution for the estimated prevalence in each region.
 
 Overall, the predicted prevalence on a regional basis using this method ranged from < 0.2% in the low-
prevalence region, to 6% – 10% and 30% – 40% in the moderate- and high-prevalence regions respectively
(Table 6).
 
 Table 6: Probability distributions for input values and predicted prevalence by region  
 Region  % Suspect/forward traces
> Infected
 % Under surveillance/
neighbours > Infected
 Predicted prevalence distributions 
  min  mode  max  min  mode  max Minimum  5%  Mean  95%  Maximum
 LP  20%  30%  40%  10%  20%  30%  0.1%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%  0.2%
 MP  20%  30%  40%  20%  40%  60%  6%  6%  8%  9%  10%
 HP  20%  30%  40%  30%  50%  70%  28%  32%  36%  41%  44%
7 Total        6%  6%  7%  7%  8%
 
 
 Estimated flock-prevalence from abattoir surveillance data
 The true prevalence of infected flocks was also estimated from abattoir surveillance data, after adjusting for the
assumed sensitivity of abattoir surveillance under various scenarios of disease prevalence. Briefly, a Bayesian
approach was used which allows combination of any prior information available on test sensitivity and
specificity and disease prevalence with the available data to produce posterior probability distributions for
flock-sensitivity and prevalence (Joseph et al., 1995).
 
 In this case prior distributions for the flock-sensitivity of abattoir surveillance were based on simulated
estimates for each region (details not shown) and prevalence distributions were based on the regional
prevalence estimates derived from general surveillance as shown above. Specificity of abattoir surveillance was
assumed to be close to 100%. The data from abattoir surveillance in Table 4 was used as input data, and the
model was run for 25,000 iterations for each region, with the last 20,000 iterations used to estimate test
sensitivity and disease prevalence.
 
 The input distributions for assumed sensitivity and output distributions for prevalence are summarised for each
region in Table 7. Map 5 shows the estimated median prevalence on a regional basis. Briefly, 95% probability
intervals for flock-prevalence ranged from 0.04% – 1.2%, 8% – 14% and 30% – 39% for low-, moderate- and
high-prevalence regions respectively. These results are sensitive to the value and strength of the prior
distributions used, particularly for the flock-sensitivity of abattoir surveillance. Thus, if the estimates of
sensitivity of abattoir surveillance are inaccurate, these prevalence estimates may under- or over-estimate the
true prevalence accordingly. These estimates were slightly higher than the original estimates for the low- and
moderate-prevalence regions and slightly lower for the high-prevalence region, but were comparable for the
overall prevalence across NSW. They were also comparable to or slightly lower than estimates based on the
results of laboratory investigations, suggesting that they are probably reasonable estimates of the true flock-
prevalence in these regions.
 
 Extrapolation to a state level suggests that about 6% – 8% of flocks (2000 – 3000 flocks) are likely to be
infected across NSW. If the sensitivity of abattoir surveillance has been underestimated, or if the abattoir
surveillance data is significantly biased these estimates may under-estimate the true prevalence substantially.
 
 Table 7: Estimated flock-sensitivity of abattoir surveillance
and flock-prevalence of OJD
   Percentiles of output distributions
 Region  Parameter  2.5%  median  97.5%
 LP  Assumed Se  26%  35%  45%
  Prevalence  0.04%  0.4%  1.2%
 MP  Assumed Se  45%  55%  64%
  Prevalence  8%  11%  14%
 HP  Assumed Se  79%  89%  96%
  Prevalence  30%  34%  39%
 
 
 Risk factors for spread of OJD
 M a paratuberculosis i  an obligate pathogen of animals, with transmission primarily through the faeco-oral
route although transmission through milk or to the unborn foetus also occur (Sweeney RW, 1996). Thus,
spread of infection between properties is generally dependent on the movement of animals, particularly
through sale and purchase of infected animals (Sweeney RW, 1996).
 
 Spread of OJD in Australia has been mainly due to the movement of infected sheep or by local spread between
neighbouring flocks. There is no documented evidence of spread other than through contact with infected
sheep, or grazing of land previously grazed by infected sheep, although indirect spread through air- or water-
borne movement of infected faeces between neighbouring properties cannot be ruled out. Other potential
mechanisms of local spread include shared grazing and facilities, common use of roads and straying sheep.
8Further clarification of the relative importance and effect of each of these mechanisms is unlikely due to the
difficulty in reliably separating their individual effects.
 
 
 Risk of neighbours and trace forwards
 The available surveillance and tracing data was analysed to evaluate the relative importance of spread to
neighbouring properties and through the movement of sheep.
 
 The status of all properties identified as neighbours of known infected properties was determined where
possible, and duplications removed from the data. Flocks that did not have a status recorded were assumed to
be of non-assessed or nil-assurance status. From this data the relative risk of ever having been infected was
estimated for properties with one, two or three or more infected neighbours, compared to properties with no
known infected neighbours. Overall, properties with one known infected neighbour were about 12 times more
likely to be infected than those with no infected neighbours, increasing to more than 50 times more likely for
properties with three or more infected neighbours (see Table 8). In the moderate prevalence zone only, the
estimated relative risks were 7, 22 and 43 for having 1, 2 or ³ 3 known infected neighbours respectively.
 
 The proportion of neighbours resolved as infected was also estimated on a regional basis (Table 9). About 15%
of all neighbours in the high-prevalence region have been confirmed infected, compared to 9% in the
moderate-prevalence region. However, if only properties that have been resolved to a status other than suspect
or under surveillance were included, these figures increased to 76% and 42% respectively. There was
insufficient data for the low-prevalence region for it to be included in this or the following analysis of forward
tracings.
 
 
 Table 8: Relative risk of being infected increases with the number of
infected neighbours
 # IN Neighbours   # infected  Total  % IN  Relative
Risk
 0  29361  253  29614  0.9%  1
 1  1548  175  1723  10.2%  12
 2  279  95  374  25.4%  30
 3 – 6  88  76  164  46.3%  54
 Total  31276  599  31875   
 
 Table 9: Percentage of neighbours infected by region
 Status  MP  HP  Total
 Resolved infected  90  210  300
 Resolved negative  125  67  192
 Unresolved  818  1169  1987
 Total  1033  1446  2479
 % of total infected  9%  15%  12%
 % of resolved infected  42%  76%  61%
 
 A similar analysis was also undertaken for forward tracings from known infected properties. 15% of traces
originating from the high-prevalence region have been resolved as infected compared to 11% for traces from
the moderate-prevalence region (Table 10). Again, these figures increased substantially to 42% and 23% if
only properties that had been fully resolved were included.
 
 Table 10: Percentage of traced properties infected by
region of origin
 Status  MP  HP  Total
 Resolved infected  64  95  159
 Resolved negative  218  129  347
 Unresolved  313  403  716
 Total  595  627  1222
9 % of total infected  11%  15%  13%
 % of resolved infected  23%  42%  31%
 
 
 Analysis of tracing flows
 The distribution of forward tracings from known infected flocks was analysed to determine if the observed
distribution of cases was consistent with the pattern of tracings. Map 6 shows the distribution of tracings
between districts. The width of the base of the arrow is proportional to the number of tracings from that district
to the corresponding destination district. Table 11 summarises the distribution of traces by region of origin and
destination, and Table 16 & Map 7 show the total number of forward-tracings identified to each RLPB district.
Only about 6% of all traces were to properties in the low-prevalence region, compared to 45% and 49% to the
moderate and high prevalence regions respectively. Of the 135 tracings to the low prevalence region, less than
half were from the high-prevalence region. These figures represent the total number of sheep movements
recorded. As many properties have had multiple tracings identified to them the actual number of properties
traced in each region is substantially lower (see Table 12). There was also a strong correlation between the
number of tracings to a district and the number of known infected flocks in the district (r2 = 0.93).
 
 
 Table 11: Number of forward traces by region of origin and
destination
  Region of destination
 Region of origin  LP  MP  HP  Total
 LP  17  0  1  18
 MP  66  780  169  1015
 HP  52  222  923  1197
 Total  135  1002  1093  2230
 
 Table 12: Number of traced properties by region of origin and
destination
 
  Region of destination  
 Region of origin  LP  MP  HP  Total
 LP  9  0  0  9
 MP  49  467  79  595
 HP  40  135  452  627
 Total  98  602  531  1231
 
 Thus the main risk factors for spread of OJD are proximity to infected flocks or introduction of sheep from an
infected flock. Further elucidation of the mechanisms involved in neighbourhood spread was not possible from
the data, and is unlikely to be possible except by a purposely-designed research project. Even then it is likely to
be difficult to differentiate between the various mechanisms involved. The impact of both introductions and
neighbourhood spread appears to vary between regions, as would be expected, presumably due to the varying
length of time that flocks have been infected in different areas.
 
 
 Rate of spread
 It was not possible from the available data to estimate the rate of spread of OJD, either between flocks or
between regions, or whether or not the rate of spread is changing. The data presented here is a result of spread
that occurred mostly more than 3 - 5 years ago, and thus monitoring changes in rates of spread is virtually
impossible in any realistic time-frame. Any analysis of rates of spread is also further complicated by the fact
that many properties identified by tracing or as neighbours remain unresolved for some years, either due to the
reluctance of producers to test, or to allow time for the disease to reach detectable levels in the flock.
 
 However, the data does indicate that there is a high rate of spread between neighbouring flocks, particularly if
allowed to occur unchecked over a long period. The rate of spread between neighbours appears to be
substantially higher in high-prevalence regions, compared to moderate-prevalence areas, presumably because
of the longer-standing infection with increasing prevalence and contamination allowing more opportunities for
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spread. It is unlikely that any regulatory action taken to date has had any real impact on spread between
neighbours.
 
 The rate of spread due to movement of sheep is also substantial, although apparently considerably less than
that for spread between neighbours. As this is the main mechanism of spread to new foci of infection this is of
significant concern. Regulatory action on infected and suspect flocks and the introduction of zoning and
movement restrictions are likely to have reduced the level of ongoing spread through the movement of sheep,
although it has not been possible to measure this.
 
 In the longer term it may be possible to monitor changes in the rate of spread through some proxy variable
such as the time between infection and detection of new cases or the number of new cases detected in a region.
These statistics must be interpreted with care, as they are subject to many biases, particularly associated with
the level of effort being put into detection of cases in a district. Even then, they still represent the effects of
spread that occurred several years ago, rather than current spread.
 
 Potential distribution of ovine Johne’s disease in NSW
 There has been considerable debate in recent years over the potential distribution of OJD in NSW (and
Australia), in terms of the ecology of M a paratuberculosis and its ability to survive and spread in adverse
environments or under unfavourable conditions of soil type and climate.
 
 There is no clear evidence, either in Australia or from the international literature of an effect of soil type on the
survival and spread of M a paratuberculosis. There is some evidence from Spain that Johne’s disease in sheep
and goats was more prevalent in areas with more-acid soils (Revirieg  FJ et al., 2000), while a review of
Johne’s disease in the USA found that evidence of any association of disease with soil type was equivocal
(Johnson Ifearulundu YJ and Kaneene JB, 1997). Any assessment of the impact of soil type in Australia is
likely to be severely confounded by the fact that historically the disease first appeared and spread in an area of
predominantly acid soils. In addition, many of the sheep grazing areas of NSW suffer from varying degrees of
soil acidity due to past and current pasture improvement practices, further complicating any such analysis.
 
 Thus, although an effect of soil acidity on survival and spread of OJD cannot be ruled out, it is unlikely to
greatly affect the distribution of the disease in NSW, except in the more extensive pastoral zones.
 
 It has also been hypothesised that soil type may affect expression of the disease in infected animals (i.e.
animals become infected at the same rate, but do not progress to clinical disease or progress at a slower rate).
This was one possible finding suggested from a recent survey of infected flocks (I Lugton, personal
communication). It also has a certain logical appeal, in that it is not unreasonable to suppose that deficiencies
in some micro-nutrients may affect the ability of M a paratuberculosis to survive and multiply in vivo. This is
particularly the case considering the highly specific nutrient requirements for culture of the organism in vitro.
Despite this there is still no firm evidence to support or reject this hypothesis.
 
 There has been little research on the survival and spread of M a ar tuberculosis, particularly under
Australian conditions. Ongoing research in NSW and Victoria is currently investigating the survival of sheep
strains of M a paratuberculosis in soil and water under various conditions. Preliminary results suggest that the
organism is capable of surviving for weeks or months in either faecal pellets or water under varying climatic
conditions (R Whittington, personal communication). Thus, it appears likely that even under extreme climatic
conditions such as occur in western NSW M a paratuberculosis will survive in water holes, around sheep
camps or in other sheltered areas for long enough to infect other sheep.
 
 It therefore appears reasonable to assume that M a paratuberculosis i  capable of surviving and spreading in
any sheep-producing area of NSW (and probably Australia). This hypothesis is further supported by the fact
that OJD has been recorded in many countries with Mediterranean or semi-arid climates similar to that
experienced in parts of western NSW. For example, Johne’s disease has been recorded by the OIE as occurring
in countries such as Spain, Greece, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Lebanon, South Africa and Zimbabwe. In fact,
in parts of Spain 50% – 60% of flocks are reported as being infected (Mainar Jaime RC and Vazquez-
Boland JA, 1998; Juste RA et al., 1991). Obviously some areas are likely to favour survival and spread
more than others, and as already discussed soil type and acidity may also affect survival and expression of
disease, so that the incidence of clinical disease is likely to vary between regions.
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 The potential for spread and progression of OJD in currently low-prevalence areas can be extrapolated to some
extent from experiences in higher prevalence districts. Anecdotal evidence suggests that OJD was probably
first introduced into the Young Rural Lands Protection District in the late 1980’s. Since that time there appear
to have been multiple introductions from the central and southern tablelands, as well as local spread between
neighbouring flocks. By 31 December 2000, 2.4% of flocks in the district were known to be infected, with a
further 12.5% either suspect or under surveillance and 11% of lines examined by abattoir surveillance were
positive. Thus the true prevalence of infected flocks in this district may be as high as 10% – 15%. Given this
result, it is likely that similar progression would occur in other districts where conditions were suitable for
spread. Therefore, in the absence of measures to prevent ongoing introductions and local spread, it is likely
that the disease would be endemic in much of NSW within 15-20 years, with a flock-prevalence of ³10% in
many districts.
 
 
 Control strategies
 Current control strategies for OJD are based on a regulatory approach using quarantine, zoning and movement
restrictions. This approach is likely to be reasonably successful in preventing spread of infection to previously
free areas, and the establishment of new foci of infection, depending on the level of compliance of producers
with movement controls. However it is unlikely to have a significant impact on neighbourhood spread in most
instances.
 
 Therefore a new approach is required to minimise further spread from current and new infected flocks to
susceptible flocks in the surrounding area:
 
 Possible measures include (but are not limited to):
 
· Continued restrictions on the movement of sheep between zones, based on a risk assessment
approach and negative flock status;
· Continued restrictions on the movement of sheep off known or suspected infected flocks;
· Risk-based approach to continued trading for infected/suspect flocks in the residual zone;
· Prompt and thorough investigation of flocks identified by tracing in low prevalence districts;
· Pre-emptive vaccination or depopulation of infected and high-risk suspect flocks to minimise the
risk of further spread in low prevalence districts;
· Ongoing surveillance programs in all zones for detection of infected flocks;
· Intensive surveillance of neighbours of infected flocks in low prevalence districts to ensure early
detection and implementation of control measures;
· Prevalence reduction on infected farms through management changes and/or vaccination;
· Vaccination (compulsory or voluntary) of flocks neighbouring known infected flocks;
· Vaccination (compulsory or voluntary) of all flocks in the district/zone;
· Use of vendor declarations when selling/purchasing sheep within a zone;
· Development of group strategies to work together to control and eliminate the disease on an area
basis.
Selection of appropriate strategies is required to meet the specific objectives of the control program in each
zone. Development of OJD control strategies is the subject of a separate series of papers for the National
Control Strategies Workshop and therefore is not discussed further here.
A risk-based approach to control (Infected Flock Profiles)
Current regulatory controls are based on a zero-risk approach to quarantine of infected and suspect flocks,
through property quarantine and sale of sheep for slaughter only. This results in severe financial hardship for
many producers, lack of support for the program and possibly non-compliance with the quarantine conditions.
The introduction of a risk-based approach to trading from infected and suspect flocks in the residual zone may
allow easing of these restrictions on some flocks, subject to risk-management strategies, facilitating expanded
trading opportunities and thus reducing the hardship on affected producers. This approach requires a detailed
risk-assessment of each flock, and of the risk-management strategies in place to reduce prevalence and the risk
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associated with sale sheep. Movements between properties that are assessed as not significantly increasing the
risk of infection for the destination property or district additional movements may be allowed. For example,
sale of vaccinated rams to other suspect or infected flocks within the residual zone.
Future surveillance requirements
Low-prevalence regions
Control in low-prevalence regions must rely on:
1. Minimising the risk of introducing OJD from higher prevalence regions;
2. Early detection of any infected flocks and prompt action to minimise local spread; and
3. Support of industry to implement the measures – failure of industry support will result in continuing
spread of the disease.
To achieve these outcomes it is important that surveillance in these areas be maintained at a high level, with a
multi-part approach, including:
· Continued abattoir surveillance to maintain confidence in the low-prevalence status of the region.
· Use of Property Identification Codes to identify slaughter sheep, facilitating reliable trace-back to
the property and district of origin.
· Tracing from known infected flocks, with thorough investigation of traced flocks in the low-
prevalence region for early detection of infection.
· More sensitive flock testing using PFC for SheepMAP, MAP equivalent and Check testing to
ensure earliest possible detection of infected flocks
 
 Moderate-prevalence region
 This region will require a higher level of control to minimise spread within and out of the region. This will
require the support of ongoing surveillance for the early detection of infected flocks in a similar fashion to the
low-prevalence region.
 
 High-prevalence region
 Control in high prevalence regions must rely on methods to reduce prevalence and minimise spread between
neighbouring properties, as well as minimising spread through trade in sheep.
 
 If this approach were taken there would be a reduced emphasis on surveillance for the identification/quarantine
of infected flocks. Instead, surveillance would be required to monitor the prevalence and severity of disease
over time as the program progresses. Appropriate surveillance methods may include:
 
· Continued abattoir surveillance to provide ongoing monitoring of the severity and prevalence of
OJD in these regions
· SheepMAP testing for flocks wishing to continue trading outside the region
· Check test or SheepMAP for flocks wishing to provide low-risk sheep within the region
Other surveillance issues
Abattoir surveillance
The effectiveness of abattoir surveillance as a surveillance tool is currently greatly hampered by the lack of a
reliable sheep identification system. This has two significant effects on the surveillance value of the data:
1. Some infected lines cannot be reliably identified to their property of origin, particularly
where they are part of ‘boxed-lots’ purchased from abattoirs.
 
2. Significant biases are present in the data associated with:
¨ examination of multiple lines per property;
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¨ identification of lines to the incorrect district;
¨ mis-identification of infected sheep to the wrong line;
¨ bias towards detection of larger flocks which are more likely to consign direct to the abattoir,
and under-representation of smaller flocks selling through saleyards.
Data quality
All three data sources used in this study suffer from significant biases inherent to the nature of the data and the
way it was collected. In addition, some of the data was either incomplete or in some cases incorrect.
Substantial effort is required to ensure that the available data is complete and reliable, and systems are required
to ensure that this is the case.
Discussion
The analyses presented here are based on passive surveillance data provided either by the Rural Lands
Protection Boards or from NSW Agriculture’s laboratory information system (Labsys), or from abattoir
surveillance activities. As such, all these data sources suffer from a number of inherent biases and deficiencies,
particularly in relation to representativeness and completeness of data. In addition, a number of simplifying
assumptions have been made during the analysis of the data, in order to support some of the modelling
techniques necessary to produce some reasonable estimates of OJD prevalence and distribution. Therefore, the
results presented should be regarded as indicative estimates, rather than definitive.
Despite these limitations, this analysis presents some important findings that must be considered in any future
planning for OJD surveillance and control:
· The current prevalence of known infected flocks in NSW is about 1.6%, with a further 8% of flocks
currently either suspect or under surveillance;
· The true prevalence of infected flocks is probably around 6% – 8%, but may be higher or lower;
· There is no evidence to date of any independent foci of infection in the north or west of the State –
extensive surveillance in these areas by serology, PFC and abattoir surveillance has found very few
infected flocks, virtually all of which can be traced back to introductions from the endemic areas;
· OJD in NSW is still highly clustered, with the great majority of known and projected infected flocks in the
central and southern tablelands and adjoining districts;
· Probably the greatest risk factor for OJD infection is being a neighbour of one or more infected flocks –
this risk appears to be greater in the high-prevalence region, where the disease has been present for
longer;
· The greatest risk factor for introduction of infection into a district is the introduction of sheep from an
infected flock, particularly an infected flock in the high-prevalence region;
· The regional spread of OJD appears to follow closely the pattern of sheep movements from known infected
flocks;
· The relatively few infected flocks identified to date in the low-prevalence areas is probably due to the
comparatively low number of introductions into these areas from the higher-risk regions;
· Once established in the low-prevalence areas the disease is likely to spread further to neighbours and
through sheep movements in much the same manner as in other districts;
· There may already be some infected flocks in these areas that are only recently infected and are still at too
low a prevalence to be detected, as well as a few higher-prevalence flocks that are yet to be detected.
This analysis suggests that OJD is still limited in its distribution in NSW, but that there is likely to be a low
number of unidentified infected flocks in the current low-prevalence regions. Identification of these flocks and
implementation of measures to prevent continuing spread between neighbouring flocks are essential for the
effective control of OJD in NSW.
Evan Sergeant
Technical Specialist, Disease Surveillance and Risk Management
NSW Agriculture
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Appendix: Summary tables by Rural Lands Protection Board
Table 13: Prevalence of known infected flocks by RLPB and Region
Board Zone Region #
Flocks
# IN # SU # US % IN
(prevalence)
% SU % US Regional
Prevalence
Armidale CON LP 2000 0 1 1 0 0.1% 0.1% 0.07%
Balranald CON LP 152 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Broken Hill CON LP 108 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Bombala CON LP 293 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Bourke CON LP 159 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Brewarrina CON LP 175 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Nyngan CON LP 600 0 2 0 0 0.3% 0.0% 0.07%
Casino CON LP 3 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Cobar CON LP 160 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Condobolin CON LP 1642 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Riverina CON LP 740 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Hunter CON LP 215 0 1 0 0 0.5% 0.0% 0.07%
Dubbo CON LP 1314 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Northern New EnglandCON LP 1248 0 4 0 0 0.3% 0.0% 0.07%
Gloucester CON LP 12 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Grafton CON LP 7 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Hay CON LP 394 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Hillston CON LP 180 0 1 0 0 0.6% 0.0% 0.07%
Maitland CON LP 15 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Moss Vale CON LP 675 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Milparinka CON LP 43 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Narrabri CON LP 255 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Kempsey CON LP 20 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Tweed-Lismore CON LP 201 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Walgett CON LP 526 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Wanaaring CON LP 76 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Northern Slopes CON LP 520 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Wentworth CON LP 125 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Wilcannia CON LP 138 0 0 0 0 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Narrandera CON LP 978 1 3 0 0.1 0.3% 0.0% 0.07%
Coonabarabran CON LP 670 1 1 5 0.1 0.1% 0.7% 0.07%
South Coast CON LP 490 1 0 0 0.2 0.0% 0.0% 0.07%
Coonamble CON LP 390 1 3 3 0.3 0.8% 0.8% 0.07%
Tamworth CON LP 1157 3 4 7 0.3 0.3% 0.6% 0.07%
Mudgee-Merriwa CON LP 879 3 5 6 0.3 0.6% 0.7% 0.07%
Moree CON LP 223 1 4 0 0.4 1.8% 0.0% 0.07%
Wagga Wagga CON MP 1803 10 61 83 0.6 3.4% 4.6% 1.6%
Murray CON MP 1049 6 7 27 0.6 0.7% 2.6% 1.6%
Forbes CON MP 1540 13 72 72 0.8 4.7% 4.7% 1.6%
Cooma CON MP 668 6 12 27 0.9 1.8% 4.0% 1.6%
Gundagai CON MP 867 9 18 65 1.0 2.1% 7.5% 1.6%
Hume CON MP 963 21 37 117 2.2 3.8% 12.1% 1.6%
Young CON MP 1945 46 38 204 2.4 2.0% 10.5% 1.6%
Braidwood CON MP 565 14 21 42 2.5 3.7% 7.4% 1.6%
Molong CON MP 1104 31 20 46 2.8 1.8% 4.2% 1.6%
Yass R/C MP 1200 30 67 126 2.5 5.6% 10.5% 1.6%
Goulburn RES HP 1082 72 82 230 6.7 7.6% 21.3% 9%
Central Tablelands RES HP 2306 237 251 840 10.3 10.9% 36.4% 9%
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Total 31875 506 715 1901 1.6% 2.2% 6.0%
Table 14: Summary of OJD testing, 1/4/1998 to 31/12/2000 by RLPB
Gel Histology Pooled Faecal Culture
Board Submissions % +ve Tests % +ve Submissions % +ve Tests % +ve Submissions % +ve Tests % +ve
Armidale 306 7% 18128 0.1% 43 0% 75 0% 115 0% 384 0%
Balranald 3 0% 479 0.0% 1 0% 7 0%
Bombala 31 0% 2428 0.0% 5 20% 18 11% 3 0% 12 0%
Bourke 1 0% 1 0.0% 1 0% 7 0%
Braidwood 85 40% 17498 0.5% 27 30% 60 32% 14 50% 54 35%
Brewarrina 12 0% 1663 0.0% 2 0% 4 0% 1 0% 2 0%
Broken Hill 20 0% 671 0.0% 1 0% 1 0% 3 0% 23 0%
Central Tablelands 595 45% 73822 1.0% 262 52% 467 48% 69 28% 317 14%
Cobar 1 0% 17 0.0%
Condobolin 15 0% 1623 0.0% 1 0% 10 0%
Cooma 176 14% 16608 0.2% 48 8% 101 5% 71 4% 272 3%
Coonabarabran 33 3% 3078 0.1% 11 18% 23 13% 4 0% 9 0%
Coonamble 19 0% 1724 0.0% 8 13% 35 3% 7 0% 46 0%
Dubbo 121 2% 10347 0.0% 21 10% 47 6% 13 8% 46 7%
Forbes 203 23% 26781 0.4% 92 18% 265 11% 18 0% 94 0%
Gloucester 1 0% 1 0.0%
Goulburn 157 51% 18604 1.0% 82 51% 152 48% 26 23% 79 27%
Grafton 2 0% 9 0%
Gundagai 148 24% 19693 0.3% 38 26% 130 15% 36 8% 120 4%
Hay 19 21% 3918 0.1% 2 0% 3 0%
Hillston 10 20% 1931 0.1% 1 0% 1 0% 2 0% 11 0%
Hume 218 30% 26095 0.7% 82 45% 252 25% 83 19% 250 16%
Hunter 6 0% 296 0.0% 1 0% 1 0%
Maitland 5 0% 12 0.0% 2 0% 3 0%
Molong 219 27% 27478 0.4% 66 32% 148 18% 44 11% 205 4%
Moree 15 20% 2945 0.2% 2 50% 3 33%
Moss Vale 32 9% 1274 0.3% 2 50% 3 67% 6 17% 8 13%
Mudgee-Merriwa 1 0% 100 0.0% 21 5% 37 3% 1 0% 7 0%
Murray 223 15% 29050 0.2% 38 16% 91 11% 17 6% 68 1%
Narrabri 29 0% 1893 0.0% 1 0% 3 0% 3 0% 18 0%
Narrandera 25 0% 2237 0.0% 1 0% 3 0% 6 0% 29 0%
Northern New
England
69 12% 5541 0.2% 10 10% 14 14% 9 0% 32 0%
Northern Slopes 8 0% 567 0.0% 2 0% 8 0%
Nyngan 19 0% 3810 0.0% 4 0% 48 0%
Riverina 83 5% 5059 0.1% 2 0% 15 0% 15 0% 39 0%
South Coast 13 31% 2730 0.5% 4 25% 12 42%
Tamworth 41 20% 4870 0.3% 10 20% 29 10% 16 6% 82 2%
Tweed-Lismore 1 0% 14 0.0%
Wagga Wagga 180 14% 26556 0.2% 39 13% 67 12% 48 2% 125 1%
Walgett 8 0% 856 0.0% 2 0% 8 0%
Wanaaring 1 0% 187 0.0%
Wentworth 4 0% 160 0.0%
Wilcannia 3 0% 12 0.0% 1 0% 1 0% 1 0% 5 0%
Yass 202 34% 27681 0.6% 64 28% 149 28% 24 4% 80 1%
Young 363 30% 54660 0.3% 116 28% 218 18% 80 15% 266 8%
Total 3724 25%443098 0.5% 1108 32% 2486 23% 745 10% 2725 6%
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Table 15: Summary of abattoir surveillance by RLPB
Lines
Board Zone Region +ve inc -ve Total % +ve Regional
prevalence
Armidale CON LP 1 445 446 0.2% 0.3%
Balranald CON LP 1 1 0.0% 0.3%
Broken Hill CON LP 51 51 0.0% 0.3%
Bombala CON LP 1 107 108 0.9% 0.3%
Bourke CON LP 141 141 0.0% 0.3%
Brewarrina CON LP 127 127 0.0% 0.3%
Nyngan CON LP 203 203 0.0% 0.3%
Cobar CON LP 107 107 0.0% 0.3%
Condobolin CON LP 204 204 0.0% 0.3%
Riverina CON LP 1 76 77 1.3% 0.3%
Hunter CON LP 34 34 0.0% 0.3%
Dubbo CON LP 1 1077 1078 0.1% 0.3%
Northern New England CON LP 82 82 0.0% 0.3%
Grafton CON LP 1 1 0.0% 0.3%
Hay CON LP 37 37 0.0% 0.3%
Hillston CON LP 33 33 0.0% 0.3%
Maitland CON LP 2 2 0.0% 0.3%
Moss Vale CON LP 14 14 0.0% 0.3%
Milparinka CON LP 13 13 0.0% 0.3%
Narrabri CON LP 75 75 0.0% 0.3%
Kempsey CON LP 1 1 0.0% 0.3%
Walgett CON LP 2 327 329 0.6% 0.3%
Wanaaring CON LP 24 24 0.0% 0.3%
Northern Slopes CON LP 82 82 0.0% 0.3%
Wentworth CON LP 4 4 0.0% 0.3%
Wilcannia CON LP 51 51 0.0% 0.3%
Tamworth CON LP 371 371 0.0% 0.3%
Narrandera CON LP 2 254 256 0.8% 0.3%
Coonabarabran CON LP 2 93 95 2.1% 0.3%
South Coast CON LP 2 2 0.0% 0.3%
Mudgee-Merriwa CON LP 5 109 114 4.4% 0.3%
Coonamble CON LP 115 115 0.0% 0.3%
Moree CON LP 105 105 0.0% 0.3%
Wagga Wagga CON MP 15 2 757 774 2.2% 7.2%
Murray CON MP 6 170 176 3.4% 7.2%
Cooma CON MP 3 139 142 2.1% 7.2%
Gundagai CON MP 23 3 412 438 5.9% 7.2%
Forbes CON MP 15 2 641 658 2.6% 7.2%
Young CON MP 80 5 670 755 11.3% 7.2%
Hume CON MP 14 228 242 5.8% 7.2%
Braidwood CON MP 17 79 96 17.7% 7.2%
Molong CON MP 24 2 258 284 9.2% 7.2%
Yass R/C MP 66 4 292 362 19.3% 7.2%
Goulburn RES HP 191 11 545 747 27.0% 30%
Central Tablelands RES HP 203 12 426 641 33.5% 30%
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Table 16: Forward traces by Region of origin
Region of origin
Destination district HP MP LP Total
Armidale 2 15 1 18
Bombala 1 5 6
Bourke 1 1
Braidwood 6 34 40
Brewarrina 1 1 2
Central Tablelands 643 81 1 725
Condobolin 1 5 6
Cooma 2 42 44
Coonabarabran 5 2 3 10
Coonamble 1 1
Dubbo 13 6 19
Forbes 73 67 140
Goulburn 280 88 368
Gundagai 4 34 38
Hillston 1 1 2
Hume 3 107 110
Hunter 1 1
Molong 46 88 134
Moree 1 2 3
Moss Vale 2 3 5
Mudgee-Merriwa 10 13 3 26
Murray 5 5 10
Narrabri 2 2
Narrandera 1 4 2 7
Northern New England 2 1 3
Northern Slopes 5 1 6
Nyngan 2 2
Riverina 3 1 4
South Coast 1 1
Tamworth 3 1 5 9
Wagga Wagga 8 119 127
Walgett 1 1
Yass 21 64 85
Young 54 220 274
Total 1113 612 18 1743
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Summary 
 
The prevalence of OJD flock infection in the current Residual Zone in NSW and within some foci 
of infection in the surrounding Control Zone has now reached the level where existing control 
strategies are inappropriate and unacceptable to many affected producers. 
The majority of new flock infection with OJD in NSW now appears to be the result of lateral 
transmission from an adjoining infected property rather than forward movement by sheep 
trading. Lateral spread can occur indirectly by movement of contaminated material or directly 
by straying infected sheep.  
Controlling the lateral spread of infection from an infected property to adjoining properties 
requires prevention or significant reduction of environmental contamination on the infected 
property if transmission is by environmental means such as water movement, and significant 
reduction in infection and shedding rates if transmission is by straying sheep. In high disease 
prevalence areas, destocking of individual properties to remove environmental contamination is 
not rational because the risk of reinfection from infected neighbours remains.  
This paper proposes the wider use of vaccination as a critical element of effective disease 
control for OJD in NSW - as an addition (and not as an alternative) to current disease control 
strategies for reducing regional spread of this disease.  
Vaccination is currently the only likely effective strategy to achieve widespread reduction of 
environmental contamination, and hence lateral spread, in the Residual Zone and in infected foci 
in the Control Zone.  
To minimise disease spread from infected properties, vaccination should be undertaken in all 
infected flocks, immediately they are recognised as infected, to prevent a future rise in disease 
prevalence and land contamination. In many situations, the reduction of environmental 
contamination will require all sheep in the infected flock including adult sheep to be promptly 
vaccinated. Sheep subsequently introduced to these properties should also be vaccinated. 
Where there is an identified high risk of lateral transmission, consideration also needs to be 
given to the potential benefit of pre-emptive (prophylactic) vaccination in flocks not currently 
identified as infected, especially on properties adjoining or downstream of a high prevalence 
infected flock. 
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Initially, the proposed strategy is to encourage vaccination by producers with infected flocks on 
a voluntary basis, with the possible option of tactical vaccination on a compulsory basis in 
situations where the risk of transmission to adjoining properties is high or the consequences are 
serious (eg infected neighbour of MAP flock). Progression to strategic compulsory vaccination 
over entire infected catchment areas is an option for future consideration. 
To encourage vaccination and the voluntary submission of as yet unidentified infected flocks to 
diagnostic testing, trading of vaccinated sheep should be permitted between infected flocks.  
It is proposed that trading of vaccinated sheep from infected properties in the Control Zone and 
the Proposed Protected Zone be permitted to suspect and infected properties in the Residual 
Zone and, with prior CVO approval, to other infected properties in the Control Zone, but not the 
Proposed Protected Zone. However, trading of vaccinated sheep between infected properties 
within the Proposed Protected Zone could be permitted with prior CVO approval, for example to 
permit the continued sale of rams from an infected stud in the Proposed Protected Zone to 
existing clients in the Proposed Protected Zone whose flocks are also infected.  
Trading of vaccinated sheep from infected properties in the Residual Zone would be permitted to 
suspect and other infected properties in the Residual Zone and, with prior CVO approval, to 
infected properties in the Control Zone. Note that movement of vaccinated sheep to any infected 
property in the Control Zone would require prior CVO approval, based on assessment that the 
movement will not increase the risk of lateral spread at destination. 
Trading of vaccinated sheep from any infected property in any zone to a suspect property in the 
Residual Zone would be restricted to vaccinated sheep from a demonstrated low disease 
prevalence mob on a low prevalence infected property.  
Movement of vaccinated sheep from the Control Zone or Residual Zone into the Proposed 
Protected Zone would not be permitted in any circumstances.  
Once controlled trading of vaccinates has been introduced, trading of sheep from infected flocks 
that have not been vaccinated as lambs would be limited to trading from demonstrated low 
prevalence infected flocks in which there has been a significant reason for delaying the 
introduction of vaccination, with such trading restricted to sales to infected and suspect flocks in 
the Residual Zone only.)  
All vaccinated flocks will be subject to quarantine or undertakings in lieu of quarantine.  
Any increased risk of disease spread as a result of permitting such trading from infected 
premises will be more than compensated by a reduction of illegal trading of infected sheep, 
increased detection of infected flocks and improved recognition of potentially infected sheep if 
they are moved outside the Residual Zone.  
By permitting widespread vaccination and controlled trade in vaccinates, an overall increase 
in disease control is expected.   
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Introduction 
 
This paper discusses options for use of vaccination against OJD in NSW.  Consideration is given 
to the experience with vaccination in other countries, and the current OJD situation in NSW, 
particularly in terms of continued spread.  Recommendations are made regarding future use of 
Gudair® vaccine in NSW to control the spread of OJD. 
 
Principles 
 
• Lateral spread of Mycobacterium paratuberculosis between adjoining properties by means 
other than intended sheep movement is now recognised as a significant source of new 
property infections in NSW. Controlling the spread of OJD in NSW cannot be achieved 
without controlling lateral spread of infection. 
  
• The only practical way to reduce lateral spread from infected properties is to significantly 
reduce the contamination of land.  This is the same basic principle underlying disease control 
by destocking OJD affected land. 
 
• Based on overseas experience and the interim results of vaccine research in NSW, 
vaccination of infected flocks in both Residual and Control Zones of NSW would delay or 
suppress faecal shedding of mycobacteria and thereby control rising infection rates in these 
flocks and the resultant increase in land contamination.  In this way spread to adjoining 
properties can be reduced. Whole of flock vaccination is likely to provide the most 
immediate and greatest benefit. 
 
• Controlling local spread of OJD in areas with a high prevalence (>30%) of infected flocks 
such as the current Residual Zone will be difficult or impossible without widespread 
vaccination to suppress environmental contamination and flock infection rates. 
 
• Voluntary vaccination to control spread can be encouraged by facilitating local markets 
for trading in vaccinated sheep 
 
• Vaccination will not interfere with detection of OJD infected flocks so long as all vaccinates 
are permanently and clearly marked. 
 
• Vaccination and effective identification of vaccinates will greatly assist disease control by 
identifying many potentially infected sheep, particularly if such potentially infected sheep are 
moved without permit to other districts. 
 
• All vaccinated flocks should be quarantined  
 
 
Background 
 
Research in other countries has shown that vaccination of sheep and goats against 
Mycobacterium paratuberculosis in flocks infected with Johne’s disease has the following 
effects: 
• >90% reduction in the number of clinical cases of  Johne’s disease 
• >90% reduction of faecal shedding of M. ptb organisms 
Preliminary results from Australian trials also suggest that vaccination delays the onset and/or 
reduces the level of faecal shedding, although the impact of vaccination on clinical disease and 
mortality rates under Australian pastoral conditions remains uncertain. 
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M. ptb is not known to replicate outside the mammalian host. Therefore, any significant 
reduction in clinical disease and/or faecal shedding will result in a significant reduction of 
environmental contamination on the land on which infected flocks are run. 
 
If it is accepted that vaccination reduces faecal shedding in infected flocks, and hence 
environmental contamination, it should be accepted that vaccination has a potentially important 
role to play in controlling the spread of infection between adjoining properties. This is supported 
by considerable field experience with JD vaccination in sheep and goats overseas. 
 
Reduction of environmental contamination with M. ptb can reasonably be expected to reduce the 
rates of: 
• local inter-property disease spread by environmental transfer (eg in run-off water);  
• new infections of individual sheep in infected flocks (by reducing environmental 
challenge to uninfected animals on infected properties, thereby reducing, on an inter-
generational basis, the infection rate in subsequent years), and therefore  
• local inter-property disease spread by straying of small numbers of sheep. 
 
Reducing the prevalence of infected sheep in infected flocks will reduce the rate of disease 
spread by sheep trading as well as localised spread, especially when trading involves small 
numbers of animals. The risk of introducing infection to a clean flock with sheep from an 
infected flock, assuming a 90% reduction in shedding, would reduce the probability of disease 
transmission from a vaccinated infected flock with a pre-vaccination infection rate of 10%, for a 
group of 10 sheep, from 70% to 10%. This could provide a significant reduction in the rate of 
inter-property disease transmission by small numbers of straying sheep.  
 
Overseas, vaccination has been used successfully to control the spread of JD in small ruminants. 
Animal health authorities in these countries, particularly in Iceland, considered vaccination to be 
a sufficiently critical control strategy to make the vaccination of susceptible animals compulsory 
in JD control zones. (Reported outcomes from vaccination of sheep and goats in the field against 
JD are much more positive than the reported experience with vaccination of dairy cattle.) 
 
When vaccination is introduced in a flock, in most circumstances all adult and juvenile sheep 
should be vaccinated as well as newborn lambs.   
 
In many situations the prevalence of infection in a flock will be low when vaccination is 
introduced and hence most adult sheep can be vaccinated pre-exposure and develop some level 
of protective immunity. (Pre-exposure vaccination of adults is likely to be more effective than 
post-exposure vaccination.) This should greatly reduce the spread of infection through the flock 
and hence the risk of lateral spread. If adult sheep in an infected flock are not vaccinated, many  
may become infected when exposed at a later date, particularly where challenge is high. 
Therefore, if lambs only are vaccinated, infection and disease rates may increase over time 
amongst the unvaccinated adults in the flock, thereby increasing early pre-vaccination challenge 
for subsequent cohorts of lambs.  
 
Overseas the vaccination of adults in heavily infected flocks has been reported to precipitate a 
spike in the mortality rate due to acceleration of the disease process in infected sheep in the late 
preclinical stage. This has not been observed in Australia to date.  
  
The critical point for reduction of pasture contamination following introduction of vaccination 
occurs when there are no unvaccinated sheep left on the property, clinical cases have ceased and 
all lambs are being vaccinated prior to significant challenge. Potentially, this process of 
eliminating pasture contamination and hence challenge to subsequent cohorts of lambs can 
commence 4 or 5 years earlier if all sheep in the flock are vaccinated initially, not just lambs.   
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Vaccination alone however is unlikely to provide effective control of OJD spread immediately, 
because a proportion of vaccinated sheep continue to shed the mycobacteria. On a group basis, 
vaccinates remain infectious and contaminate properties to which they are moved, albeit at a 
lower rate than unvaccinated infected sheep. Effective movement controls for vaccinated sheep 
are therefore critical to effective disease control. 
 
The identification of vaccinated sheep also provides a very significant indirect advantage for 
disease control. If vaccination is restricted to infected sheep or sheep from infected properties or 
infected areas, mandatory identification of all vaccinates will ensure these potentially infectious 
sheep are readily recognised if they are moved illegally to any other area.  
 
The current national policy on vaccination against OJD is in principle inappropriate for the 
disease situation currently prevailing within the residual zone and in infected foci in the control 
zone. This policy is making the control of local disease spread very difficult, by prohibiting the 
introduction of vaccination until the disease prevalence in infected flocks and hence 
contamination on infected properties has risen to a level where local spread is more than likely. 
 
Under the current NRA permit for the Gudair® vaccine, vaccine use is permitted to reduce 
unacceptable losses due to OJD, but is not permitted to facilitate strategic disease control. 
 
Opposition to wider use of vaccination against OJD in NSW is based on two main arguments.   
These arguments are that: 
• wider use of vaccination will make future control of OJD more difficult by interfering 
with diagnostic tests used to detect OJD infected sheep; and 
• wider availability of vaccination to reduce economic losses from the disease will reduce 
the motivation of producers to eradicate or control the spread of disease in areas where it 
is present, thereby facilitating spread to other areas and creating ongoing control costs in 
such areas including future costs of vaccination. 
 
The reality is that mandatory identification of vaccinates will actually assist the recognition of 
sheep with a potential infected status rather than interfere with diagnosis.  Provided vaccinated 
sheep are effectively and permanently identified, vaccination will not interfere with other OJD 
control strategies. 
 
The second opposing argument is also incorrect. Whatever economic disincentives for adoption 
of any alternative control strategy may be created by vaccination, this must be limited to flocks 
experiencing high mortality as these are the only flocks with an economic incentive for control 
by any strategy including any alternative strategy to vaccination.  In other flocks, vaccination or 
any other strategy could not be justified on existing economic (mortality) grounds alone, 
although producers may justify vaccination or other strategies on a predicted risk of future high 
mortality. Conversely, in flocks with pre-existing high mortality, vaccination is already now 
permitted to reduce economic loss and the proposed policy for wider use of vaccination therefore 
does not affect these flocks.  
 
In low prevalence infected flocks, the only reasons to undertake any disease control measure, 
vaccination or otherwise, are reduction of further pasture contamination and therefore future 
increasing mortality from OJD and hence a reduction of the risk of spread to neighbours. 
Controlling the normal rise in disease incidence by use of vaccine in these flocks also actually 
maintains the potential to utilise alternative disease control/elimination methods, when or if they 
become available in the future.   
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For the owners of infected flocks, vaccination can provide a short-term option for legal trading to 
other similar flocks whilst pursuing the long-term theoretical objective of eliminating the 
infection from the flocks and land by continued vaccination over many years.  
 
If long-term vaccination is successful in eliminating the OJD mycobacteria from a significant 
proportion of infected flocks and properties, the benefit for regional disease control is clear.  The 
prevalence of infected flocks in areas where destocking is not currently an economically rational 
approach could be reduced to a level where it is again rational. 
 
Pre-emptive Strategic Vaccination 
 
Secondary spread of infection from neighbouring properties adjacent to known infected 
properties may occur before any infection is detected on the neighbouring property itself. (This is 
demonstrated by tracebacks to neighbours of known infected properties). Accordingly, there may 
be a case for vaccination of high-risk neighbours, for example, neighbours where there is a 
history of straying sheep, significant downstream water flow or poor fencing. In such cases, 
vaccination and quarantine may be indicated to reduce further spread. 
 
Accordingly, where there is: 
• a high  risk of inter-property disease transmission; 
• significant consequences if such further transmission occurs; and 
• no other practical or economic means to prevent such transmission 
vaccination of the known infected flock and the flock at risk should be considered. 
 
This raises three questions. 
• When and where is it appropriate to vaccinate animals to reduce spread? 
• Which animals should be vaccinated? 
• What movement controls should be placed on vaccinated sheep? 
 
In simplest terms, vaccination to reduce spread is indicated in all situations in which 
spread is likely to occur and no alternative strategy to prevent spread such as destocking is 
planned.  In such situations, all susceptible animals (adults and lambs) should be vaccinated to 
minimise the spread of infection (unless the lambs are destined for slaughter before the age at 
which shedding may commence). 
 
Within any infected flock, all susceptible animals should be vaccinated to prevent them being 
affected by the disease. In other words, the principle being applied here is that where there are 
sheep that are likely to be exposed to infection and that are likely to develop the disease, 
preventative vaccination is deemed appropriate. 
 
Given the evidence of local environmental spread, in terms of disease control, it makes no 
difference which side of a boundary fence the susceptible sheep are located on. That is, it makes 
no difference whether they are on the infected property or an adjoining property. The only 
important point is that they are likely to be exposed to infection and transmit the infection to 
other sheep. 
 
However, vaccination of sheep on an adjoining property which is not a known infected property 
immediately raises the issue of what is appropriate permitted trading for such sheep. The fact 
that such sheep have been vaccinated does indicates that there was some perceived risk of 
infection. Accordingly, it is appropriate that any vaccinated flock is subject to movement 
restrictions, even within the zone.  In effect, vaccinated flocks should be subject to quarantine, 
whether classified as infected or suspect. 
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In high disease prevalence areas where the risk of infection from adjoining properties is high for 
producers who adopt any disease control procedure, producers must be encouraged to undertaken 
disease control on a group basis, preferably with the group based on a land catchment area. In 
high prevalence areas, to obtain support from all producers in an area for a local OJD program 
and to reduce the likelihood of re-infection of producers who choose to destock or undertake 
disease reduction plans aimed at long-term eradication, it will be important that all producers in 
the area have access to vaccination. Withholding vaccine from one producer in the area on the 
basis of lack of current evidence of infection could prevent the establishment of the group 
control program or compromise success if it is established. 
 
In the Control Zone, it is proposed that vaccination of infected flocks will initially be voluntary, 
but should become compulsory when appropriate funding arrangements are in place. A staged 
progression to compulsory vaccination of infected flocks in the Residual Zone should also be 
considered, subject to appropriate funding arrangements.  (Discussion of the appropriate funding 
arrangements is beyond the scope of this particular paper.) 
 
Compulsion may be necessary to reduce the risk of lateral spread from infected properties, 
particularly where the consequences of such spread would be serious, for example if the 
adjoining property has an MAP flock.  The justification for compulsion may be greater where the 
risk of pre-existing infection on adjoining properties is less, for example in the Control Zone in 
contrast to the Residual Zone.   
 
Compulsory vaccination however may be difficult to justify unless it is undertaken at minimal 
cost to the affected producer.  A progressive introduction of compulsory vaccination, initially 
restricted to high-risk situations, is therefore proposed after a period of wider availability of 
vaccination on a voluntary basis.   
 
In particular, there is a need to vaccinate flocks with a high prevalence of infected sheep.  
Vaccination of adults in these flocks can be undertaken without compromising longer-term 
disease control objectives. 
 
It is proposed that voluntary vaccination of suspect properties be permitted in the Residual Zone 
(but not the Control Zone).  However, vaccination of suspect flocks should only be permitted 
where there are reasonable objective grounds for suspicion of infection. It is not proposed to 
permit a voluntary assumption of suspect status by a flock owner for the purpose of gaining 
access to vaccine for prophylactic reasons. 
 
Movement of Vaccinates 
 
Vaccination is not a stand-alone control strategy for preventing regional spread of this disease 
because a proportion of vaccinates that are subsequently exposed do become infected and some 
of these become faecal shedders. Movement controls are therefore necessary to prevent 
vaccinated sheep transmitting infection to uninfected flocks. Experience overseas suggests that 
movement control plus vaccination will give a higher level of control over disease spread 
than either strategy alone. 
 
Since vaccination is restricted to animals that are infected or at a significant risk of infection, all 
vaccinated animals must be considered a significant risk to uninfected sheep, given that some 
infected vaccinates will continue to shed the JD mycobacteria.  
 
Movement controls on vaccinated sheep must be designed with this potential threat from 
vaccinated animals to the control of disease spread in mind.  
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Movement of vaccinated sheep to areas or individual properties should not be permitted where 
such movement would increase the risk or prevalence of disease occurring at the destination. 
Accordingly, the presence of vaccinated sheep should not be permitted in a Protected Zone. 
 
Use of vaccine in infected flocks should be permitted within Control (including Potential 
Protected) Zones and Residual Zones for both strategic disease control and alleviation of losses. 
Use of vaccine on infected properties within a Potential Protected Zone with CVO/Veterinary 
Committee approval is also appropriate to prevent spread to adjoining properties, given an 
understanding that under the current SD&Rs, vaccinated animals on infected properties will have 
to be destocked if the area wishes to progress to Protected Zone status. 
 
Movement of vaccinated sheep can be safely permitted to properties or areas that already have an 
equivalent or higher risk or prevalence of infection to that of the source property or area - 
without compromising disease control. Accordingly, trade in vaccinated sheep between infected 
properties should be permitted. Regulated trade in vaccinated sheep should also be permitted 
from infected properties in the Residual Zone and Control Zone to higher-risk suspect properties 
within the Residual Zone.  
 
Trade in unvaccinated sheep from infected or suspect properties should only be permitted where 
there is evidence the disease is present at low prevalence in the source flock and there are good 
reasons related to disease control for delaying the introduction of vaccination in the flock (eg 
where time is needed to clarify a suspect status and there is no immediate risk of lateral spread).  
 
In some high-prevalence areas, all properties would be “high-risk”.  In these areas, vaccination 
should be encouraged in as many flocks as possible. 
 
It is therefore proposed that movement of sheep from infected properties other than for slaughter 
be limited to sheep vaccinated as lambs in flocks undertaking Property Disease Reduction Plans, 
except where there is a good reason for delaying the introduction of vaccination in a flock that 
has a demonstrated low prevalence of infection.  
 
Movements will only be permitted in accordance with the table below. 
 
Proposed Permitted Movements of Vaccinated Sheep from Infected Properties in NSW 
Origin Destination 
 RZ CZ PPZ 
Infected Property in 
RZ 
 
Infected or Suspect 
property 
Infected property 
(with CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
Infected Property in 
CZ 
Infected or Suspect 
property 
Infected property 
(with CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
Infected Property in 
PPZ 
Infected or Suspect 
property 
Infected property 
(with CVO approval) 
Infected property (with 
CVO approval*) 
    *exceptional circumstances only 
 
Where vaccination is permitted in a high-risk suspect flock, the same restrictions on trade from 
the suspect flock will apply as though the flock was a known infected flock. 
 
It is proposed that vaccination be permitted only on properties undertaking an approved Property 
Disease Reduction Plan (PDRP). The PDRP will normally comprise management strategies as 
well as vaccination, but in some situations, vaccination may be the only appropriate strategy.
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RECOMMENDATIONS: 
 
1. That vaccination be recognised nationally as a valid and potentially valuable 
adjunct strategy for controlling the regional spread of OJD, not just as a strategy 
for alleviating economic loss on the most heavily infected properties.  
  
2. That vaccination be permitted in any known OJD infected flock for control of 
disease spread within and from the infected property on which the flock is run, from 
the time that infection is first detected in the flock and without regard to the existing 
level of infection or mortality in the flock. 
 
3. That vaccination be permitted in any suspect flock where there is a significant risk 
that lateral spread will occur from that flock or where the consequences of such 
spread, if it occurred, would be serious. 
 
4. That vaccination be permitted in any at-risk or suspect flock that is part of an 
approved Group (Catchment) OJD control scheme in a Residual Area or an 
infected focus in a Control Area, subject to all of the participating owners’ 
cooperating with ongoing attempts by the local RLPB to clarify the true infection 
status of all flocks in the scheme. 
 
5. That trading of vaccinated sheep be permitted from infected properties according to 
the following schedule:  
Origin Destination 
 RZ CZ PPZ 
Infected 
Property in RZ 
Infected or 
Suspect property 
Infected property 
(with CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
Infected 
Property in CZ 
Infected or 
Suspect property 
Infected property 
(with CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
Infected 
Property in PPZ 
Infected or 
Suspect property 
Infected property 
(with CVO approval) 
Infected property (with 
CVO approval*) 
                                       *exceptional circumstances only 
 
6. Notwithstanding Point 5, that trading of vaccinated sheep from an infected property 
in any zone to a suspect property in the Residual Zone be permitted only from a 
known low prevalence infected mob in a known low prevalence infected flock that is 
undertaking a property disease reduction plan involving management strategies as 
well as vaccination. 
 
7. That after the introduction of voluntary vaccination for all infected flocks, trading 
of unvaccinated sheep from infected flocks be permitted only from known low 
prevalence infected mobs in known low prevalence infected flocks that are 
undertaking a Property Disease Reduction Plan involving management strategies 
and where there has been a reasonable cause to delay the introduction of 
vaccination in the source flock, such trading of unvaccinated sheep to be permitted 
to infected flocks only in the Residual Zone. 
 
8. That clear and permanent identification of all vaccinates remains mandatory. 
 
9. That vaccination only be permitted in flocks that are quarantined and undertaking 
an approved Property Disease Reduction Plan.  
 
 
End 
Prepared by Ian Links for NSW Agriculture 05/04/01  CSW Purchase Risk  Printed  04/04/069:22 AM 1
NATIONAL OVINE JOHNE’S DISEASE CONTROL AND EVALUATION 
PROGRAM 
NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON CONTROL STRATEGIES 
Canberra, April 17th-18th, 2001 
 
 
OJD RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  
WHEN PURCHASING SHEEP OR GOATS 
 
Prepared by NSW Agriculture – 4th April 2001  
 
 
 
OJD Risk Management Strategies when Purchasing Sheep or Goats 
 
The probability of introducing infection from an infected flock is dependent on the level 
of infection in the vendor flock, the number of animals introduced and whether there 
have been multiple introductions over a period of years (e.g. annual purchase of rams). 
Where disease is present at a high prevalence in a flock (e.g. 10% or more animals 
infected), the purchase of any number of animals, including small numbers of rams, 
presents a high risk of introducing disease. Where the prevalence of disease in a flock is 
very low (e.g. less than 2% of animals infected), the probability of introducing infection 
with the purchase of small numbers of animals (e.g. rams) is quite low.  However the 
risk of infection from purchase of larger numbers (e.g. a mob of 100 wethers) is 
significant, i.e. there is a high probability that an infected animal is present in the 
purchased mob, see Figure 1 for probability graph. 
 
Flocks which participate in assurance programs provide a source of low-risk sheep and 
goats for potential purchasers. Purchase from low-risk areas further reduces the risk. It 
is also essential to consider the implications on your enterprise and financial viability as 
well as potential effects on neighbours should OJD be introduced into your flock or goat 
herd. 
 
 
 
 
End 
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Figure 1: Probability of introducing infection from flocks  with varying prevalence and number of 
animals introduced (refer to legend key for 1, 5, 10, 20, 50 or 100 animals)  
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NATIONAL OVINE JOHNE’S DISEASE CONTROL AND EVALUATION PROGRAM 
NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON CONTROL STRATEGIES 
Canberra, April 17th-18th, 2001 
 
 
NEW SOUTH WALES  
KEY ISSUES AND PROPOSALS 
 
Prepared by NSW Agriculture – 4th April 2001  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The need to implement control measures for ovine Johne’s disease, over and above those 
currently available under the national program, is the primary focus of submissions from 
NSW to the National Ovine Johne’s Disease Control Strategies Workshop.  This paper 
summarises the problems, and the proposed solutions, from a NSW perspective.   
 
This summary paper is supported by: 
 
¾ Epidemiological assessment of ovine Johne’s disease in New South Wales,  Evan 
Sergeant for NSW Agriculture, February 2001 
 
¾ Lateral Transmission of Ovine Johne’s Disease – a case study,  NSW Agriculture and 
Rural Lands Protection Boards, April 2001 
 
¾ Principles and Strategies for Control of Ovine Johne’s Disease,  NSW Agriculture, 
April 2001 
 
¾ Principles for Strategic Vaccination to Control Ovine Johne’s Disease in NSW,  NSW 
Agriculture, April 2001 
 
¾ Proposed Model for Control of Ovine Johne’s Disease in NSW,  NSW Agriculture, 
April 2000 
 
 
Key Issues to be addressed from a NSW perspective 
 
1. Current lack of understanding of epidemiology - modes of spread of OJD in NSW and their 
relative importance with regard to disease control in NSW. 
 
2. The significance of lateral spread of Mycobacterium paratuberculosis organisms by various 
vectors – infected stock, contaminated water, contaminated soil, wind, etc. 
 
3. The requirement for a re-evaluation of the control aspects of the program in NSW in the 
light of the above. 
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4. The requirements of the other states in terms of short and long term exclusion/control of 
OJD. 
 
5. The risks to other states presented by significant numbers of early infected and therefore 
unidentifiable (with current technology) animals associated with lateral spread in NSW – 
implications for the MAP. 
 
6. The relationship between on-farm control and regional control in NSW. 
 
7. The problem of increasing environmental contamination within NSW. 
 
8. Requirement for availability of effective control strategies in new foci of infection in NSW 
which are well removed from the Residual Zone. 
 
9. Potential control strategies – identified and evaluated – movement restrictions (quarantines 
and zoning), destocking,  property disease reduction plans, strategic vaccination. 
 
10. Risks associated with the potential control strategies – inability of many producers to 
comply with movement restrictions and remain solvent, current efficacy and practicality of 
destocking, efficacy of PDRPs with and without vaccination, efficacy of current zoning 
within NSW, risks associated with vaccination (efficacy, vaccination lesions, OH&S, 
imported vaccine). 
 
 
Proposed Model for OJD Control within NSW 
 
ZONING 
Effectively divide NSW into three zones: 
Residual Zone or high prevalence region (RZ), 
Control Zone or buffer region (CZ), 
Proposed Protected Zone or apparent low prevalence region (PPZ). 
 
Basic principles are: 
¾ minimum unit for implementation of zoning will be an RLPB division or equivalent, 
¾ PPZ status should be instituted at least 12 months prior to the expected date of application for 
Protected Zone (PZ) status, 
¾ a section of CZ (buffer) should normally separate any part of the PPZ from any part of the 
RZ, 
¾ for the purpose of interstate movements from NSW the PPZ will continue to operate as part 
of the CZ, 
¾ the RZ boundary needs to be continually reassessed in the light of current surveillance data 
and trading history, 
¾ districts applying for PPZ status must demonstrate likely low prevalence of infection and 
producer support for eventual progression to Protected Zone (PZ) status, subject to revision 
of PZ criteria. 
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POLICY 
Policy will be revised to provide a measured response according to known/apparent 
prevalence of infection, ie a separate policy for each zone. 
 
Basic principles are: 
¾ many aspects of the current policy will be appropriate for the CZ,   
¾ surveillance, suspect flock investigations and implementation of disease control measures  in 
the PPZ will be more stringent than under current policy,   
¾ movement controls within the RZ will be significantly reduced,   
¾ surveillance within the RZ will continue and those flocks looking to establish and/or 
maintain freedom from infection within the RZ will be encouraged, and subsidised,  to utilise 
the MAP.  
 
 
PROPERTY DISEASE REDUCTION PLANS (PDRP) 
PDRPs will be strongly encouraged, supported by policy and ideally by assistance 
measures, within all three zones. 
 
Basic principles are: 
¾ some trading concessions contingent upon implementation of PDRP and trade from lower 
risk mobs or age groups, 
¾ profiling of flock infection should be an integral part of any PDRP, 
¾ potential for disease elimination without total destocking (as originally proposed by Morris 
Hussey) should be explored, 
¾ specific strategies for infected MAP/stud flocks to assist genetic salvage and trading options. 
 
 
TESTING 
On the basis of current sensitivity and specificity assessments, pooled faecal culture (PFC) 
will be the preferred screening test for all surveillance and assurance testing in NSW. 
 
Basic principles are: 
¾ early detection and use of the most sensitive test available will be essential for 
implementation of effective control in all three zones, 
¾ progression of status in NSW will be by PFC only, unless use of serology is approved, on a 
case by case basis, by the OJD coordinator or his delegate. 
 
 
VACCINATION 
Revision of current NRA permit and national Veterinary Committee rules is essential to 
allow vaccine to be used within the RZ and CZ for strategic control, and to permit 
regulated trade in vaccinated stock. 
 
Basic principles are: 
¾ use of vaccine in infected flocks within the RZ permitted for both strategic disease control 
and alleviation of losses with CVO approval, 
¾ use of vaccine in infected flocks within the CZ permitted for both strategic disease control 
and alleviation of losses with CVO approval, after VetComm endorsement on a district or 
regional basis, 
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¾ use of vaccine in infected flocks within the PPZ permitted for both strategic disease control 
and alleviation of losses with CVO approval and VetComm endorsement on a case by case 
basis, 
¾ trade, subject to regulations, in vaccinated stock permitted within and into the RZ and the 
CZ, 
¾ trade of vaccinates between infected flocks in the PPZ may be permitted by the CVO 
on a case by case basis, where exceptional circumstances apply. 
 
end 
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RESOLUTIONS  
 
(CARRIED BY CONSENSUS) 
 
 
GENERAL: 
  
1. The National Workshop agrees that giving effect to the principle of ongoing control of 
Ovine Johne’s Disease (OJD) in keeping with the current national OJD program is 
critical. 
 
2. The National Workshop agrees that, in light of new scientific knowledge and 
surveillance data, there is a need for significant change to OJD control strategies in 
NSW, as proposed in the model presented from NSW.  The changes proposed at this 
workshop will enhance the national program but will only be effective with financial 
support for producers. 
 
3. The National Workshop agrees that an alteration in the approach to regulation in the 
high prevalence areas should occur, consistent with the need to have OJD control 
strategies appropriate to the prevalence of disease in that area. 
 
4. The National Workshop agrees that communication, education and industry ownership 
are extremely important and require greater emphasis during the national program. 
  
5. The National Workshop agrees that greater support must be provided to affected 
producers whilst unaffected producer’s flocks must be protected from OJD  
 
6. The National Workshop notes that there is a relationship between the level of producer 
support for any regulatory disease control program and success of that program. The 
National Workshop agrees that the level of support from sheep producers that is 
necessary for successful containment of the spread of OJD infection in NSW is 
unlikely to be achieved without financial assistance for affected producers including 
producers in high prevalence areas. 
 
7. The National Workshop agrees that whilst movements of infected sheep potentially 
result in transmission of infection over large distances, lateral spread of OJD between 
adjoining properties by mechanisms other than intentional movement of sheep is now 
recognised as an increasingly important factor in disease spread.  
 
8. The National Workshop noted the epidemiology papers indicating that the distribution 
of OJD was still restricted, with large areas of NSW showing little or no evidence of 
infection. The workshop also noted the reports from NSW that indicate significant 
levels of mortality associated with OJD are increasingly being reported in NSW.  
 
NATIONAL OVINE JOHNE’S DISEASE CONTROL AND EVALUATION PROGRAM 
 
NATIONAL WORKSHOP ON CONTROL STRATEGIES 
FOR OVINE JOHNE’S DISEASE IN NEW SOUTH WALES 
 
AMA House, Canberra, April 17th-18th 2001 
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9. The National Workshop agrees that rapid implementation of the resolutions from this 
workshop should occur if producer support in New South Wales for the national 
control program is to be improved. The need for greater grass roots support for the 
program is well recognised. 
 
10. The National Workshop notes that the control strategies for NSW endorsed by this 
workshop have the broad support of the NSW sheep industry through the NSW OJD 
Advisory Committee. 
  
11. The National Workshop agrees that it is fundamentally important that the adoption of 
the strategies agreed upon at this workshop is supported financially. Funds should, as a 
matter of priority, be directed from national and state funding sources to the 
implementation of these strategies for OJD control in NSW including the specific on-
farm strategies. 
 
 
VACCINATION – THE NEED FOR VACCINATION  
 
12. The National Workshop agrees that vaccination is now recognised as a potential key 
element in developing an effective OJD control program for NSW and, subject to 
proof of efficacy, an essential adjunct control strategy and alternative to property 
destocking for controlling the spread of OJD from infected properties to adjoining 
properties, not merely a strategy for alleviating economic loss on heavily infected 
properties. 
 
13. The National Workshop notes that, despite the recommendations from this National 
Workshop for immediate wider use of vaccination for control of lateral spread of OJD 
in NSW, the current trials to assess the efficacy of an OJD vaccine under Australian 
conditions remain essential to provide objective data to support continued use of 
vaccination in the future to control OJD and to obtain future access to a registered 
vaccine product for OJD affected producers as soon as possible.  The National 
Workshop notes that future use of the vaccine will need to be reviewed if the current 
research finds that the vaccine is not as effective under Australian conditions as is 
currently expected.  
 
14. The National Workshop agrees that effective regional disease control for OJD is 
dependent upon effective control of disease spread within and from individual infected 
properties. 
 
15. The National Workshop agrees that controlling the lateral spread of infection from 
OJD contaminated properties to adjoining properties will be difficult or impossible 
without effective strategies to limit the spread of infection and mycobacterial shedding 
within infected flocks and the resulting increase in land contamination on infected 
properties. 
 
16. The National Workshop agrees, however, that vaccination must be used in conjunction 
with other disease management strategies and with strategies to ensure effective 
containment of vaccinated sheep (for example, security of fencing).  
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VACCINATION – PERMITTED VACCINE USES 
 
17. The National Workshop agrees that discussions should be initiated with the National 
Registration Authority regarding revision of the current Permit for Gudair® vaccine to 
give effect to the resolutions on vaccine use from this National Workshop. The 
National Workshop also agrees that discussions should be initiated with the NRA to 
expedite the registration of Gudair® vaccine in Australia. The National Workshop 
also agrees that discussions should be initiated with Veterinary Committee regarding 
the national Standard Definitions and Rules for OJD to give effect to the resolutions 
on vaccine use from this National Workshop.  
 
18. The National Workshop agrees that, subject to the approval of the National 
Registration Authority and the approval of the Chief Veterinary Officer of NSW, 
vaccination against OJD should be permitted in any known OJD infected flock in 
NSW for the control of disease spread within and from the infected property on which 
that flock is run, from the time that infection is first detected in the flock and without 
regard to the existing level of infection or mortality in the flock. 
 
19. The National Workshop agrees that vaccination should be considered by the Chief 
Veterinary Officer for any flock in New South Wales that is suspected of being 
infected with OJD, if there is a significant risk that lateral spread will occur from that 
flock or where the consequences of such spread, if it occurred, would be serious. The 
National Workshop agrees however that this use of vaccine on suspect properties 
should have the prior approval of the Veterinary Committee and must be subject to the 
condition that all movements of sheep from any property on which such a vaccinated 
suspect flock is run are controlled and monitored. 
 
20. The National Workshop agrees that vaccination should be permitted in any at-risk or 
suspect flock that is part of an approved Group (Catchment) OJD control scheme in a 
Residual Area or an infected focus in a Control Area, subject to the prior approval of 
the Chief Veterinary Officer. 
 
21. The National Workshop agrees that there is an urgent need to develop nationally 
accepted procedures for determining the true disease status of any suspect flock in 
which vaccination has been permitted but which subsequently seeks to progress to a 
higher disease status. 
 
22. The National Workshop agrees that flock vaccination should be considered by the 
Chief Veterinary Officer of NSW whenever there is an identified risk of lateral spread 
from an infected property in the proposed Control (Admin 2) Zone (C2Z) that does not 
promptly destock following detection of OJD. The National Workshop also agrees that 
vaccination of the C2Z infected flock should be accompanied by immediate and 
subsequent flock testing on adjoining properties assessed to be at risk of infection. 
 
23. The National Workshop agrees that whole-of-flock vaccination and the vaccination of 
any adult sheep introduced onto properties with vaccinated flocks should be permitted 
in NSW, notwithstanding the lack of research evidence for the efficacy of adult 
vaccination against OJD under Australian pastoral conditions. This endorsement for 
vaccination of adult sheep is based on overseas research that has demonstrated 
efficacy of whole-of-flock vaccination, limited preliminary observations in ongoing 
Australian vaccination trials and the urgency of the need for a strategy to control 
lateral spread of infection. 
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VACCINATION – CONDITIONS OF USE 
 
24. The National Workshop agrees that clear and permanent identification of all 
vaccinates must remain mandatory and that vaccination should only be permitted in 
flocks that are subject to official movement controls. 
 
25. The National Workshop agrees that an approved and documented Property Disease 
Management Plan (PDMP) should be required as a precondition for permission to 
vaccinate any flock in the proposed C2Z area of the NSW Control Zone and should be 
strongly encouraged for any flock that is permitted to vaccinate in any other zone. 
 
26. The National Workshop notes that the requirement for PDMP implementation as a 
condition for vaccine use has significant resource implications for NSW relating to the 
development and documentation of PDMPs. 
 
27. The National Workshop agrees that where whole-of-flock vaccination is implemented, 
flock mortality should be monitored and the flock owner advised of the potential for a 
short-term increase in the mortality rate due to the vaccination of already infected 
adults in the flock and advised of the current lack of proof of efficacy of adult 
vaccination against OJD under Australian pastoral conditions. 
 
28. The National Workshop agrees that owners of flocks that are vaccinated by contract 
vaccinators should nonetheless receive some formal training, be formally advised of 
the responsibilities of owners of vaccinated sheep and acknowledge having received 
this training and advice as a precondition of permission to have their flock vaccinated.  
 
29. The National Workshop notes concern about potential liability associated with the use 
of a vaccine product that is not yet registered by the NRA for use in Australia and 
recommends action be taken to ensure all users of the vaccine and owners of 
vaccinated sheep are made aware of the implications for them of using an unregistered 
product, to limit this liability. 
 
30. The National Workshop notes the importance of meat quality and product integrity 
issues related to vaccination against OJD and these should be continually monitored as 
vaccination is more widely adopted, with appropriate responses if necessary (e.g. 
improved training in proper vaccination techniques). 
 
 
SHEEP IDENTIFICATION 
  
31. The National Workshop agrees that the introduction of a national livestock 
identification scheme for sheep is critical for the effective future control of OJD in 
Australia. 
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PERMITTED MOVEMENTS 
 
32. The National Workshop agrees that the trading of all potentially infected sheep for 
which trading is permitted, including vaccinated sheep and assessed low-risk sheep, 
must be regulated and carefully controlled in order that the risk of disease spread at the 
point of destination is minimised. 
 
33. The National Workshop agrees that regulated trading of sheep assessed as low-risk 
(including vaccinated sheep) according to Appendix 8 of the Standard Definitions and 
Rules for OJD (under development), should be permitted from infected and suspect 
properties according to the following schedule: 
 
Origin Destination 
 RZ C1Z C2Z 
IN Property in 
RZ 
IN/SU property IN property (with 
CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
IN Property in 
C1Z 
IN/SU property IN property (with 
CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
IN Property in 
C2Z 
IN/SU property IN property (with 
CVO approval) 
IN property (with CVO 
approval*) 
SU Property in 
RZ 
IN/SU property IN property (with 
CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
SU Property in 
C1Z 
IN/SU property IN property (with 
CVO approval) 
Not Permitted 
SU Property in 
C2Z 
IN/SU property IN property (with 
CVO approval) 
IN property (with CVO 
approval*) 
                                 *exceptional circumstances only 
 
34. The National Workshop agrees that there will be a need to amend the SD&Rs for OJD 
to give effect to the recommendation from this workshop that controlled movement of 
sheep be permitted from infected properties to suspect properties in the Residual Zone. 
 
 
PROPERTY DISEASE MANAGEMENT PLANS (PDMP) 
 
35. The National Workshop endorses the concept of the PDMP which comprises 
appropriate measures aimed at control or reduction of disease on infected properties, 
elimination of infection from infected properties or exclusion of infection from 
neighbouring properties.  
 
36. The National Workshop agrees that on-farm disease control is likely to be more 
effective if management strategies designed to reduce on-farm transmission of OJD 
are introduced at the same time as vaccination. 
 
37. The National Workshop agrees that owners of properties in the proposed NSW 
Control (Admin 2) Zone (C2Z) that are known to be infected with OJD should be 
required to implement an approved PDMP.  Owners of properties outside the C2Z that 
are known to be infected should be encouraged to implement an approved PDMP.  
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38. The National Workshop agrees that permission to sell or purchase sheep to or from an 
infected property should be conditional upon development and implementation of a 
PDMP. 
 
39. The National Workshop agrees that profiling of infection within an infected flock may 
be a component of any PDMP. 
 
40. The National Workshop agrees that OJD affected producers in any zone should 
receive technical and financial assistance for the development and implementation of a 
PDMP and sources of such assistance need to be identified. 
 
41. The National Workshop notes that specific assistance strategies may be necessary for 
owners of sheep flocks who are experiencing exceptional losses due to restrictions on 
trading (e.g. some infected studs and some former MAP flocks), to assist these 
producers to develop PDMPs to maintain their trading options and salvage their 
genetics.  This is critical to achieving the level of producer support necessary for 
effective disease control in NSW.  
 
42. The National Workshop agrees that the potential for disease elimination and property 
decontamination under a PDMP without total destocking should be investigated, as 
recommended by the Hussey-Morris report. 
 
 
ZONING 
 
43. The National Workshop agrees that control of OJD in New South Wales should be 
administratively managed in three zones on the basis of  
• known disease prevalence 
• regional industry (producer) control objectives  
• consistency with the overall state disease control plan 
with control policy developed for each zone appropriate to the needs and control 
imperatives of each zone, in accordance with the proposed model for control of OJD 
in NSW as detailed in the National Workshop program papers. 
 
44. The National Workshop agrees that the three zones in NSW will be designated: 
• Residual 
• Control (Admin 1) or C1Z 
• Control (Admin 2) or C2Z 
C1Z is that area of the current Control Zone in NSW adjoining the current Residual 
Zone and which has been identified as a moderate disease prevalence area for OJD. 
The C1Z is also that area of the NSW Control Zone which is unlikely to progress to 
Protected Zone status at the same time that the C2Z part of the Control Zone in NSW 
and the Control Zone areas of other states progress to Protected Zone status.   
[NOTE:  In the National Workshop Program Papers, the C1Z area was referred to as 
the buffer Control Zone (CZ) and the C2Z area as the Proposed Protected Zone 
(PPZ).] 
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APPROVED TESTS 
 
45. The National Workshop agrees that the Technical Advisory Group of Veterinary 
Committee should review the merits of all of the available tests for OJD with a view to 
considering whether:-  
The Pooled Faecal Culture Test should be the only screening test approved on a national 
basis which, if negative and based on appropriate sampling, can result in status 
progression of an individual property for either surveillance purposes or market 
assurance.  
 
 
INFECTED PROPERTY PROFILES 
 
46. The National Workshop notes that there may be a need for Infected Flock Profiles 
(IFP) to be conducted on infected properties to support the following activities: 
• Identifying relevant traces which need to be investigated (all traces are obtained 
and all involved producers and interstate authorities are notified as per current 
policy). 
• Development of Property Disease Management Plans. 
• Genetic salvage. 
• Development of short and long-term trading options for low-risk (including 
vaccinated) sheep 
• Testing over a period of time in some flocks to assess the potential for progression 
of status.  
Funding should be provided for the investigation of the potential role of IFPs, and for 
IFP development, from the national surveillance program provided a demonstrated 
savings results, and from the research component of the national program. 
  
47. The National Workshop agrees that research into both mortality and the sub clinical 
effects of OJD is important. 
 
 
End 
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